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Lichtenstein: Abbott v. Burke: Reaffirming New Jersey's Constitutional Commitme

NOTE

ABBOTT V BURKE: REAFFIRMING NEW
JERSEY'S CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENT TO
EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY
I.

INTRODUCTION

Ever since the ratification of the United States Constitution over
two hundred years ago, "America has ...been regarded as the land
of opportunity-of equal opportunity."' And for over one hundred
years, the states have sought to imbue education with this principle of
equal opportunity by establishing public school systems open to all
children.2 In fact, the people who fought so hard and argued so elo-

1. JOHN E. COONS ET AL., PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 477 (1970)
[hereinafter COONS]. -Equality of opportunity represents the defining rhetoric of American
free-enterprise democracy." Id. at 11. See, e.g., HORACE MANN BOND, THE EDUCATION OF
THE NEGRO IN THE AMERICAN SOCIAL ORDER 4 (1966). -The theory of the democratic State,
as expressed by its noblest exponents, depends upon the equalization of opportunity for all of
its citizens, irrespective of creed or color." Id.; see also Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited
Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REv. 69, 88 (1990) (stating that "[e]quality of opportunity .. . is at the
very core of American values.").
2. All fifty state constitutions contain explicit provisions that require the state to
establish and maintain public school systems open to all children. The degree of imperative
in these constitutional commands varies substantially from state to state. For a complete
listing of these provisions, see Allen W. Hubsch, Education and Self-Government: The Right
to Education Under State Constitutional Law, 18 J.L. & EDUC. 93, 134-40 (1989). For an
analysis of these provisions with respect to their use in public school finance reform litigation, see William E. Thro, Note, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional
Provisions in Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 75 VA. L. REV. 1639 (1989).
Generally, state voters approved these constitutional amendments during the latter half
of the nineteenth century. But
[p]rior to [this] great reform, education was a private affair for both rich and poor.
The elite went to truly private schools and the poor were left essentially with the
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quently to gather support for the creation of public schools originally
intended that these schools would "permit the poor to compete"3 in
society and would be their "strongest hope for rising in the social
scale.",4 As Professors Coons, Clune, and Sugarman explain in their
book, Private Wealth and Public Education, "the sine qua non of a
fair contest system-of equality of opportunity-is equality of train5
ing. And that training is what public education is primarily about."
Nearly every American would endorse the general principle that
all children-rich and poor, black and white-deserve an "equal educational opportunity., 6 But there is a "vast gulf "7 between this noble

charity school (financed by the rich) and the rate-bill school (the rate-bill was a
tuition-like device which "taxed" the parents of attending children). Not only were
both inadequate, they became infamous . . . . The system of private education had
become closely identified with a stratified, elitist society, essentially an aristocracy.
COONS, supra note 1, at 47. See infra notes 4, 6.
3. COONS, supra note 1, at 4; see also infra note 6.
4. See COONS, supra note I, at 5. As Thaddeus Stevens once explained so well:
[Public education] is objected to because its benefits are shared by the children of
the profligate spendthrift equally with those of the most industrious and economical
habits. It ought to be remembered, that the benefit is bestowed, not on the erring
parents, but the innocent children. Carry out this objection and you punish children
for the crimes or misfortunes of their parents. You virtually establish castes and
grades founded on no merit of the particular generation, but on the demerits of
their ancestors; an aristocracy of the most odious and insolent kind-the aristocracy
of wealth and power.
Id. (quoting Thaddeus Stevens, An Appeal for Tax-Supported Schools, in THE HISTORY OF
AMERICAN EDUCATION THROUGH READINGS 114-15 (1964)) (emphasis added).
5. Id, at 3; see also David Chang, The Bus Stops Here: Defining the Constitutional
Right of Equal Educational Opportunity and an Appropriate Remedial Process, 63 B.U. L.
REV. 1, 3 n.2 (1983) (contending that "[t]rue *merit' can be rewarded only when the process
gives an equally fair chance to each person.").
6. See COONS, supra note I, at 1, 6. "Equality of educational opportunity" does not
mean uniform schools; it merely means "equality of opportunity through education," and an
equal chance to succeed. Or, as Coons, Clune, and Sugarman put it, "[t]he crucial value to
be preserved is the [equal] opportunity to succeed, not the uniformity of success." Id. at 3;
see also Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 368 (N.J. 1990) (Abbott II) (holding that the New
Jersey Constitution's "thorough and efficient education" clause requires that the state provide
all students with an "equal educational opportunity"). Practically, this means that "poorer
disadvantaged students must be given [an equal] chance to be able to compete with relatively
advantaged students" and to contribute to the society populated by both. Id at 372; Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (contending that, "[t]oday, education is perhaps the
most important function of state and local governments . . . . In these days, it is doubtful
that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity
of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right
which must be made available to all on equal terms.") (emphasis added); Paul D. Carrington,
Financing the American Dream: Equality and School Taxes, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1227 (1973)
(stating that "[tihe right to equal educational opportunity is the American Dream incarnate as
constitutional law. That every child should have a fair opportunity to rise above his humble
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principle and the dismal reality that children in property-poor school
districts receive grossly inferior educational opportunities.' As the
Supreme Court of New Jersey recently pointed out, "[tioday the disadvantaged are doubly mistreated: first, by the accident of their environment and, second, by ...
[public school systems that provide
them with] . . an inadequate education." 9
When the states began to create public school systems over one
hundred years ago, they divided their territory into hundreds of geographical sub-units, local school districts.10 States also granted the
local school board of each district the authority to levy taxes that
would provide funding solely for the public schools within each
district's boundaries. But this territorial division into local school
districts invariably created gross and substantial disparities among
districts in the total amount of property wealth located within those
districts. 1
Historically, most public school funding has been provided by ad

origins and claim the rewards that his efforts and abilities deserve is perhaps our most
widely shared idea.").
7. Abbott I, 575 A.2d at 375.
8. For a vivid and detailed description of the severe "substantive lack in the quality of
education in [New Jersey's] poorer urban districts," see id. at 394-97.
9. Id at 403.
10. One of the main pu-poses of dividing up state territory into school districts was to
ensure local control over the operation of public schools. This principle of providing for local
control of public schools, sometimes referred to as "subsidiarity," is akin to the deep-rooted
American distrust of centralized authority commonly known as federalism-"the principle that
government should ordinarily leave decision-making and administration to the smallest unit of
society competent to handle them." COONS, supra note 1, at 14. Quite simply, subsidiarity in
public education means that "local people should support and run their own schools." Id. at
15. According to Coons, Clune, and Sugarman, "[t]he primary value that . . .
[subsidiarity] . . . purports to guard is independence." lt at 15 n.8. Furthermore, "[l]ocal
control creates an incentive to be more efficient if local spenders can make some connection
between efforts to economize and the tax rates they have to pay." John J. Treacy & Lloyd
W. Frueh, II, Power Equalization and the Reform of Public School Finance, 27 NAT'L TAX
J. 285, 287 (1974). Unfortunately, the division of the states into local districts, coupled with
America's substantial reliance upon local property taxes to provide funding for its public
schools, has permitted pervasive, "systematic wealth discrimination against poor districts."
COONS, supra note 1, at xix. And this wealth discrimination is not a recent development. For
instance, around 1900, "the highest taxing (and the poorest) county [in Wisconsin] taxed at a
rate sixteen times that of the lowest (and richest), while even the average tax rate of the five
richest counties was one-sixth that of the four poorest." Id. at 50.
11. See COONS, supra note 1, at 49-50 (noting that these gross inter-district property
wealth disparities did not exist in the middle of the nineteenth century. But the economic
revolution of the late nineteenth century turned district-based public school systems into
"Frankenstein[s]." In fact, by 1900, gross inter-district property wealth disparities were already
widespread.).
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valorem taxes levied upon the property located within each district,
with the state government merely supplementing these local property
taxes.12 By using school financing formulas 3 that placed a "heavy

12. According to one prominent education finance expert, in 1985 local property taxes
amounted to forty-five percent of the total revenue raised for public education in America.
Charles S. Benson & Kevin O'Halloran, The Economic History of School Finance in the
United States, 12 J. EDUC. FIN. 495, 506 (1985). In the 1920s and 1930s that figure was
over eighty percent, and until the 1970s that figure was over fifty percent; see also JOHN D.
PULUAM, HISTORY OF E ucATnoN IN AMERICA 90 (1969) (noting that, "[b]etween 1930 and
1960, the percentage of locally raised public school funds dropped from about 83 to 55
percent."). This is one of the characteristics that made the foundation plan system of financing public education so inequitable. See COONS, supra note 1, at 63-95.
13. In 1923, George D. Strayer and Robert M. Haig wrote a report entitled Financing
of Education in the State of New York. COONS, supra note 1, at 63 n.1. In this report, "there
were two pages 'almost hidden' toward the end" that formed the "conceptual basis" of what
later became known as the foundation plan. Id Until 1960, nearly every state employed some
version of the Strayer and Haig foundation plan as the method of financing for its public
schools. Id. In their report, Strayer and Haig explained the philosophical basis of the public
school financing plan that they proposed. Id at 64. Distilled to its essence, the philosophical
goal of the foundation plan is equal educational opportunity; the practical goal of the foundation plan is for the state to determine and support some minimum level of public school
funding that will provide all students with a "basic and substantial educational offering." It
at 68. However, the actual operation of the foundation plan has deliberately fallen far short
of the lofty rhetoric. Id. This large gap between the rhetoric and reality of the foundation
plan has caused a perpetuation of what Coons, Clune, and Sugarman call "the equalization
myth," the myth that all dollars distributed under the foundation plan are equalizing. Id
The basic mechanics of the foundation plan are relatively simple and easy to understand, Under the Strayer-Haig approach, the state first establishes a dollar level (called the
foundation level) of per-pupil funding, which it guarantees to every school district. In order
to qualify for this funding guarantee, a district must impose a minimum property tax rate
(called the minimum participation rate or MPR) upon its residents. The state also determines
what the minimum participation rate will be. If a local district that taxes its property at the
MPR raises an amount of school funding that is lower than the guaranteed foundation level,
the state will pay to the district the difference between the guaranteed foundation level of
per-pupil funding and what the district actually raised by levying at the MPR. Id For
example, if the guaranteed foundation level of funding is $500 per pupil and the MPR is 1%
($1 per $100 of property wealth), a district that taxes at the MPR but raises only $300 per
pupil (because its property wealth is $30,000 per pupil) will receive $200 per pupil in state
foundation aid. But this simplified description of the foundation plan provides only a glimpse
of the tip of the iceberg. Lurking beneath the surface is a system that deliberately discriminates against property-poor districts on the basis of their relative poverty. Id at 97-160; see
also Infra note 21 and accompanying text. The primary cause of the discriminatory nature of
the foundation plan is the concept that the guaranteed foundation level of per-pupil funding is
the minimum level of school funding that a district will provide for its students. Under the
foundation plan, local school districts are permitted, and even encouraged, to exceed the
foundation level of per-pupil funding by taxing their property at a rate greater than the
MPR. According to Coons, Clune, and Sugarman, "the crux of the problem lies within that
part of the [foundation] formula which guarantees local incentive" to exceed the foundation
level of funding. Id. at 65. Furthermore, states that employ the foundation plan almost always
set the guaranteed foundation level far below what local districts need to provide their
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reliance on local [property] taxes to fund the [public school] system," 14 states created gross disparities between the amount of fund5
ing available to students who attended school in property-wealthy
districts and the amount of funding available to students who attended
schools in property-poor districts. 6 Because the wealthiest districts
students with a "basic and substantial" education. IM at 68. Therefore, while,' in theory, states
encourage districts to exceed the foundation level by raising additional property taxes, in
practice, they effectively compel districts, especially poor ones, to exceed the foundation level
by "supporting [those] poor district[s] to a woefully low level" of funding. Id at 114. As
Coons, Clune, and Sugarman point out, "[t]he wealthier districts . . . will have a far easier
time raising the additional money . . . ." This so not only because the wealthier districts
have far more wealth to tax, but also because marginal utility increases the burden of a
seemingly fair and proportional tax upon poorer districts. See infra note 49 and accompanying
text. By permitting, encouraging, and even compelling all districts to tax at a level greater
than the MPR, the state permits wealthier districts to exploit their property wealth advantage-all to the detriment of children living in property-poor districts.
14. David Richards, Education Tax Hikes are Easy, Higher School Standards Hard, 125
N.J. L.J. 1663 (1990).
15. "Wealthier and poorer are useful terms but should be clearly understood to refer in
this context to relative amounts of per-pupil tax base-not to the financial status of students,
families, or voters." Treacy & Frueb, supra note 10, at 289. In other words, property-wealthy
districts are those that have relatively high amounts of per-pupil property value in their
district and property-poor districts are those that have relatively low amounts of per-pupil
property value in their district. Clearly, two factors determine a district's per-pupil property
value: the district's total student population and its total amount of taxable property value.
For example, assume that one county within a state has three school districts. District A has
a student population of 1,000 and its property value totals $500 million; District B has a
student population of 2,000 and its property value totals $100 million; and District C has a
student population of 1,000 and its property value totals $50 million. Even though District A
has the same number of students to educate as District C, its per-pupil property wealth is ten
times larger than District C's ($500,000 vs. $50,000). Consequently, the residents of District
C would have to pay taxes at a rate ten times higher than that which the residents of
District A would have to pay in order to provide District C's students with the same amount
of local school funding. Furthermore, District B and District C have the same amount of perpupil property wealth because District B has twice as many students to educate.
16. For example, during the 1984-85 school year in New Jersey, the poorest district in
the state had a per-pupil property value of $22,322, while the wealthiest district had a perpupil property value of $7.8 million-in other words, the wealthiest district had 350 times as
much taxable per-pupil wealth as the poorest district. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 378
(N.J. 1990) (Abbott II). Also, during the same school year, per-pupil funding ranged from a
state low of $932 to a state high of $10,103; at the same time, none of the poorest districts
spent more than $2,634 per pupil, while none of the wealthiest districts spent less than
$4,055 per pupil. Id. at 387. Furthermore, during that same 1984-85 school year, the residents
of three of the state's poorest districts, Camden, East Orange, and Jersey City, paid local
taxes at the respective rates of $9.44 (per $100 of property valuation), $9.57, and $8.02. Id.,
Brief for Plaintiffs, Appendix, Table 8. Since the state's average tax rate was $3.17,
Camden's tax rate was 297.8% of the state average, East Orange's tax rate was 301.9% of
the state average, and Jersey City's tax rate was 253% of the state average. Id. By comparison, the average tax rate of the 108 wealthiest districts was $2.36, or 74.4% of the state
average. Id. Thus, while New Jersey's wealthiest districts taxed at rates five to ten times
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within a state frequently have hundreds of times the property wealth
of the poorest districts, those wealthy districts can tax their property
at far lower rates than poorer districts, yet still have far greater
amounts of school funding.' 7 Therefore, "[t]o the extent that extra

lower than the poorest districts, those wealthiest districts had anywhere from five to ten times
more per-pupil school funding as those poorest districts. See id. at 387.
Unfortunately, this is not a new phenomenon in New Jersey. For instance, during the
1971-72 school year, while the state average per-pupil property valuation was $41,026, five of
the state's poorest districts, Camden, Newark, Jersey City, Trenton, and Paterson, had respective per-pupil property valuations of $19,187, $19,815, $26,786, $20,724, and $23,232. During
the same year, while the state average local tax rate was $3.66 (per $100 of equalized
property valuation), the tax rates of these five districts were, respectively, $5.76, $6.39, $6.40,
$6.65, and $5.23. At the same time, the state average per-pupil funding amount was $1,009,
and the per-pupil funding amounts provided by these five poor districts were, respectively,
$843, $1,121, $897, $1,013, and $857. Paul L. Tractenberg, Robinson v. Cahill: The "Thorough and Efficient" Clause, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 312, 316 (1974).
Interestingly, Newark, with a per-pupil tax base of less than half of the state average
($41,026 vs. $19,815), had a per-pupil funding amount in 1971-72 that exceeded the state
average ($1,009 vs. $1,121). Newark was able to achieve this level of funding because its
residents paid a school tax rate that was nearly twice as high as the state average ($2.12 vs.
$3.69). Thus, Newark is the perfect example of a property-poor school district that taxes
itself at a rate far higher than the state average but still cannot provide its students with
anything better than an average amount of per-pupil funding.
This distressing trend continues to this day. According to the New York Tnes, "[d]ata
issued by the [New Jersey] Department of Education in March [1991] showed the average . . .expenditure per pupil [for the 1990-91 school year] was $8,210 in the state's richest
districts, $4,594 in the poorest." Jerry Gray, Jersey Plan for Schools Gets Lost in the Politics, N.Y, TIMEs, Nov. 3, 1991, § 4, at 16. Thus, a simple comparison between the average
per-pupil expenditures in the wealthiest and poorest districts reveals the following: during
1984, the wealthiest districts had, on average, 43% more per-pupil school funding than the
poorest districts; during 1990, this figure had increased to 79%. Clearly, the per-pupil expenditure disparity between New Jersey's wealthiest and poorest districts is still growing at a
substantial rate.
17. See supra note 16. This phenomenon exists in nearly every state. For instance, in
Texas, the wealthiest district has a per-pupil property value of $14 million, while the poorest
district has a per-pupil property value of about $20,000-a 700 to I differential. In other
words, the wealthiest district in Texas has 700 times as much property wealth to tax as the
poorest district. Also, the 300,000 students in Texas's poorest districts have less than 3% of
the state's total property wealth to fund their education, while the 300,000 students in the
wealthiest districts have more than 25% of the state's total property wealth to fund their
education-a differential of greater than eight to one. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 392 (Tex. 1989). Without the bare minimum foundation funding that
Texas was providing, the poorest districts in Texas would have to tax at a rate eight times
higher as the wealthiest districts in order to provide their schools with equal funding. Unfortunately, this is the same eight to one property wealth ratio that existed in 1973, when the
United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Texas' "chaotic and unjust"
public school financing scheme in San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 59
(1973). See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 67. (White, J., dissenting). To make matters worse, at the
time Rodriguez was decided, Texas had placed a statutory ceiling on tax rates of $1.50 per
$100 of equalized property valuation. Therefore, even if the poorest districts wished to
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dollars can purchase educational resources," school financing systems
based primarily upon local property taxes provide students in property-wealthy districts with enormous educational advantages compared
with the educational opportunities offered to their peers in propertypoor districts."8
According to Professors Coons, Clune, and Sugarman, modem
public school financing systems "represent the very worst basis upon
which to distribute public education, if our hope is to increase the
ability of the poor to compete. At least this is true to the degree that
poor people live in poor districts."' 9 In fact, to the extent that poor
people live in poor districts, modem public school financing systems
amount to a complete perversion of the purpose for which public
education systems were first created: to provide all students, especially those in poor families, with equal educational opportunity." Under both currently and formerly employed public school finance systems, the poverty of the parent has been imposed upon the mind of
his offspring. 2 '
During the past twenty-five years, courts in almost half of the
states have heard lawsuits in which plaintiffs have contended that
those states have violated their constitution's education clause 22 or
equal protection clause, or both, by permitting property-wealthy districts to provide their students with vastly superior educational opportunities.23 And courts in nearly half of these states have agreed with
impose a tax eight times larger as the wealthiest districts were imposing so as to have equal
amounts of per-pupil funding, state law prohibited them from doing so. Id This eight to one
property wealth ratio has not decreased at all in the eighteen years following Rodriguez,
despite (or maybe because of) the Texas Legislature's efforts to reform the state's unfair and
outdated public school financing scheme. See Billy D. Walker, Special Report: Texas School
Finance Update, 10 J. EDUc. FIN. 504 (1985); see also Deborah A. Verstegen, Equity in
State Education Finance: A Response to Rodriguez, 12 J.EDUC. FIN. 315 (1987). Obviously,
the results of these so-called "significant" reform efforts speak for themselves. Walker, supra,
at 504.
18. COONS, supra note 1, at 22.
19. Id. at 4.
20. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text; see also COONS, supra note 1, at 21
(noting that, "[o]f course, this systematic hobbling of poor districts in the race for good
schools is precisely the condition that conflicts with basic democratic values."); see also id
at xix (stating that "[t]here exists no more powerful force for rigidity of social class and the
frustration of natural potential than the modem public school system with its systematic
discrimination against poor districts.").
21. MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE IRONY OF EARLY SCHOOL REFONiM 53 (1968); see also
COONS, supra note 1, at 148 (concluding that foundation plan financing "systems are designed systematically to discriminate on the basis of wealth.").
22. See supra note 2.
23. These cases are collectively known as "public school finance reform litigation." For
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the plaintiffs in such lawsuits, and have held the states' then-existing
public school financing schemes to be unconstitutional. 24 During the
past two years alone, the supreme courts of Kentucky,' Montana,26
New Jersey, 27 and Texas 28 have all held that their states' public
school funding systems violate their state constitutions' education
clauses. Currently, there are twenty-two active lawsuits challenging
various states' public school financing systems, compared with only
eight active lawsuits two years ago.29
This Note will examine: (1) the first-generation public school
finance reform case in New Jersey, Robinson v. Cahill,30 as well as
the separation-of-powers implications of the New Jersey Supreme
Court's attempt to remedy the constitutional violation discovered in
Robinson I;31 (2) whether a different separation-of-powers concept-the political question doctrine-should bar judicial review of
the issues raised by public school finance reform litigation, in light of
the dismissal for nonjusticiability of the most recent suit filed in New
York;12 and (3) Abbott v. Burke,33 the New Jersey Supreme Court's
most recent public school finance reform decision, and how the court
has attempted to avoid34 the separation-of-powers dilemma that it faced
in Robinson v. Cahill.

a full listing of these state cases, see Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 372-73 (N.J. 1990)
(Abbott I).
24. Id
25. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
26. Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989).
27. Abbott 1I, 575 A.2d 359.
28. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
29. Roberto Suro, Equality Plan on School Financing is Upsetting Rich and Poor in
Texas, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1991, at B9.
30. 287 A.2d 187 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972), modified and af'd, 303 A.2d 273,
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973) (Robinson 1); Robinson v. Cahill, 306 A.2d 65 (N.J. 1973)
(Robinson II); Robinson v. Cahill, 335 A.2d 6 (N.J. 1975) (Robinson Mn); Robinson v. Cahill,
351 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975) (Robinson IV); Robinson v. Cahill, 355 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1976)
(Robinson V); Robinson v. Cahill, 358 A.2d 457 (NJ. 1976) (Robinson VI); Robinson v.
Cahill, 360 A.2d 400 (N.J. 1976) (dissolving the injunction).
31. See infra notes 167-225 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 91-166 and accompanying text.
33. 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990) (Abbott I1).
34. See infra notes 226-385 and accompanying text.
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11.

ROBINSON V. CAHILL, NEw JERSEY'S RECALCITRANT
LEGISLATURE, AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOL

EDUCATION ACT OF 1975

According to article eight, section four, paragraph one of the
New Jersey Constitution, "[t]he Legislature shall provide for the
maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free
public schools for the instruction of all children in the State between
the ages of five and eighteen years."3 5 While the people of New
Jersey added this provision to their constitution as an amendment in
1875,36 no branch of state government had ever "spelled out the
content of the educational opportunity" that the "thorough and efficient" clause requires, at least not before 1973. 37
In Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson ), 3' decided in April of 1973,
the Supreme Court of New Jersey ruled that the state's then-existing
system of financing public elementary and secondary schools39 vio-

35. N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1.
36. Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 291, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973) (Robinson 1).
37. Id. at 295. The first legislative attempt to define the substantive education mandated
by the "thorough and efficient" clause was the Public School Education Act of 1975. See
N.J STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:7A-4, -5 (West 1989).
38. 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
39. At the time the state supreme court decided Robinson I-in fact, until the 1976-77
school year-New Jersey employed a relatively straightforward "foundation" plan to finance
its public schools. See supra note 14. Under this plan, the New Jersey Legislature set the
guaranteed foundation level at $400 per pupil. Robinson I, 303 A.2d at 296. In addition, it
set the minimum participation rate (or MPR-the minimum local property tax rate that a
school district had to impose on its residents in order to qualify for state foundation aid) at
10.5 mills (1.05C) per dollar of taxable property value (a figure that is always listed in per
pupil terms; see supra note 15) within the school district. Id. Simply stated, under this
foundation plan, the state would guarantee to each local school district at least $400 per
pupil in school funding, provided that the school district imposed upon its residents a tax of
not less than 1.050 per dollar of taxable property valuation. Id. If a district that taxed its
residents at the MPR of 1.05C per dollar raised less than $400 per pupil, the state would
give it the difference between $400 per pupil and the amount it actually raised in local
property taxes. For instance, if such a district raised only $200 per pupil, taxing at the MPR
(because it had a very low amount of property wealth-approximately $20,000 per pupil), it
would receive state foundation aid of $200 per pupil. The state aid would guarantee that this
district had at least $400 per pupil to spend in its public schools. On the other hand, if a
district raised more than $400 per pupil taxing at the MPR, it received no foundation aid
from the state.
When the Robinson court described this guaranteed foundation level of $400 per pupil
as "grossly outdated," it was being very kind. Id. In fact, the $400 per pupil guarantee was
absurdly low and did not even approach the amount of funding needed to provide students
with a quality education. Those districts that wanted to provide their students with more than

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1991

9

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 6
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:429

this "grossly outdated," bare minimum amount of school funding-and all districts certainly
did-had to raise additional funds entirely at the local level by increasing the property tax
rate. But because rich districts typically have far more taxable property wealth than poor
districts, they will be able to exceed the $400 per pupil foundation level more easily than the
poor districts. In other words, because of its greater taxable property wealth, a richer district
can impose a lower tax rate than a poorer district when both want to raise the same amount
of school funding. In many cases, wealthier districts impose substantially lower tax rates than
poorer districts, but still have far more school funding available to them. Thus, "even though
the poor districts characteristically tax high they are unable to catch up, so great is their
relative poverty." COONS, supra note 1, at 143.
To demonstrate concretely these seemingly vague propositions, we can compare the
statistics of two New Jersey school districts-Princeton and Trenton-for the 1971-72 school
year with some of the evidence presented to the trial court in Robinson v. Cahill, 287 A.2d
187, 220 (N.J. 1972), modified and aft'd, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
Both Princeton and Trenton are located in Mercer County. In 1971, while Trenton's taxable
property wealth was $20,724 per pupil, Princeton's was $88,073 per pupil; thus, in terms of
per-pupil property value, Princeton was more than four times as wealthy as Trenton. Id For
the 1971-72 school year, both districts imposed a local property tax greater than the MPR of
10.5 mills or 1.050 per dollar of taxable property value. In fact, Trenton's local school tax
rate was 28 mills or 2.80 per dollar of taxable property wealth and Princeton's local school
tax rate was 17.1 mills or 1.71€, per dollar of taxable property wealth. Id But at the MPR,
Princeton raised $924.77 per pupil ($88,073 per pupil x .0105), while Trenton raised only
$217.60 per pupil ($20,724 per pupil x .0105). Because the amount of money Princeton
collected by taxing at the MPR clearly exceeded the $400 per pupil guaranteed foundation
level, Princeton received no state foundation aid. On the other hand, because Trenton collected significantly less than the $400 per pupil guaranteed foundation level by taxing at the
MPR, it received $182.40 per pupil in state foundation aid ($217.60 + $182.40 - $400).
Clearly, the state foundation aid to Trenton reduced the substantial per-pupil funding disparity
between these two school districts from $707.17 per pupil to $524.77 per pupil, at least for
the 1971-72 school year.
Unfortunately, because the guaranteed foundation level of $400 per pupil was abysmally low and did not provide sufficient educational funding, both Princeton and Trenton had to
exceed the MPR by imposing additional local property taxes. While Trenton, the poorer of
the two, more than doubled its local school property tax rate to 28.0 mills (where the MPR
represents the first 10.5 mills), Princeton increased its local school property tax rate by a
much smaller margin-6.6 mills-to 17.1 mills. Id And yet, because of its substantially
greater per-pupil property wealth ($88,073 vs. $20,724), Princeton's much smaller local
property tax increase of 6.6 mills yielded its residents more per-pupil funding ($581.28) than
Trenton's significantly greater local property tax increase (17.5 mills) yielded to the residents
of Trenton ($362.67 per pupil). In other words, even though the residents of Trenton made a
much greater financial sacrifice by paying a substantially higher local property tax rate (28.0
mills in Trenton vs. 17.1 mills in Princeton), the schools in Trenton had 50% less funding
than the schools in Princeton ($1,521 per pupil in Princeton vs. $1,013 per pupil in Trenton).
Id. These figures include state-distributed "minimum support aid." See infra note 64.
This result is disturbing because "fi]t is difficult to perceive, how children residing in
poor districts . . . deserve less in terms of public education." CooNs, supra note 1, at 9. But
less is precisely what the children of Trenton have received-not because they deserve less,
but rather because they happen to live in a poorer district. Under New Jersey's foundation
plan, as well as the foundation plans of most other states, "[i]na race for better
schools, . . . the poor districts are doomed to failure by their poverty." Id. at 22. At the
same time, this comparison between Princeton and Trenton reveals the central flaw of the
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40
lated the "thorough and efficient" clause of the state constitution.
In so ruling, the supreme court modified and affirmed the lower
court's judgment,4 1 which had held that the public school financing
system violated the equal protection clauses of the state and federal
constitutions, as well as the "thorough and efficient" clause. While the
supreme court agreed that the system was unconstitutional, it ruled
that the system violated the "thorough and efficient" clause, not the
state or federal constitution's equal protection clause.4 2

foundation plan. The state supports local school districts to an abysmally low foundation
level, forcing all districts to raise additional school funding with increased local property
taxes. Property-wealthy districts have a far easier time raising additional school funding. As a
result, the residents of property-wealthy districts like Princeton will always be able to provide
their children with superior educational opportunities compared with the residents of propertypoor districts like Trenton. In short, foundation plans like New Jersey's "are designed systematically to discriminate on the basis of wealth." Id. at 148 (emphasis added).
40. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
41. Robinson v. Cahill, 287 A.2d 187 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972).
42. Hon. John J.Gibbons, the recently retired Chief Judge of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, has pointed out that Robinson I,and especially the lower court
opinion, were products of the times. John J.Gibbons, Like its Lineage, Abbott is a Product
of the 2Tmes, 125 N.J. L.J. 1663 (1990). In the late 1960s and early 1970s, several state and
federal courts ruled upon claims that public school funding schemes that produced gross interdistrict disparities in per-pupil expenditures violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Il1. 1968),
aff'd per curiam without opinion sub nom. Mcnnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969) (dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted); Rodriguez
v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1972), rev'd, 411 U.S. 1
(1973) (holding that Texas's funding system violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment); Miliken v. Green, 203 N.W.2d 457 (Mich. 1972) (holding that
Michigan's funding system violated the Equal Protection Clause of both the federal and state
constitutions); Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971) (holding that California's funding
system violated the Equal Protection Clause of both the federal and state constitutions); Van
Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971) (holding that Minnesota's public
school funding system violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). In
each of these cases, the plaintiffs made the same basic claim-that these public school
funding systems discriminated against a suspect class of poor persons, and that these funding
schemes infringed upon the fundamental right to education.
However, on March 23, 1973, the United States Supreme Court flatly rejected this
type of equal protection challenge to the Texas public school funding scheme and reversed
the District Court's ruling that the scheme was unconstitutional. San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). By a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court ruled that gross
inter-district, per-pupil funding disparities produced by Texas's system of financing its public
schools did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for two
reasons: (1) education is not a fundamental right; and (2) it had not been shown that the
Texas system discriminated against any definably suspect class of poor persons because plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the residents of property-poor districts were poor themselves.
Therefore, because no fundamental right or suspect class was involved, the five-justice
majority upheld the constitutionality of the Texas funding system under a highly deferential
application of the rational basis test. In his dissenting opinion, Justice White revealed the
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In order to rule upon the constitutionality of the public school
financing system, the New Jersey Supreme Court first had to interpret
the "thorough and efficient" clause-something that state legislative
and executive officials had never bothered to do.43 After examining
the history surrounding the adoption of the 1875 amendment by the
residents of New Jersey, the court concluded "that an equal educational opportunity for children was precisely in mind."' The supreme court then defined "equal educational opportunity:" "The
Constitution's guarantee must be understood to embrace that educational opportunity which is needed in the contemporary setting to
equip a child for his role as a citizen and as a competitor in the
labor market."45 Ultimately, the supreme court concluded that the
Legislature had not satisfied its constitutional duty to provide all
students with a "thorough and efficient" education, solely on the basis
of gross disparities in per-pupil expenditures among property-wealthy
and property-poor districts, because it had "been shown no other

flaws in the majority's analysis, and he did so in a very convincing manner. See Rodriguez,
411 U.S. at 63-73 (White, J., dissenting).
The Supreme Court of New Jersey handed down its opinion in Robinson I only
twelve days after the United States Supreme Court handed down its opinion in Rodriguez.
The New Jersey court affirmed the trial judge's holding that New Jersey's public school
financing system was unconstitutional, but modified the rationale for this holding in light of
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez. In fact, Chief Justice Weintraub,
the author of the unanimous opinion in Robinson I, devoted a substantial portion of his
opinion to a detailed discussion of Rodriguez. See Robinson 1, 303 A.2d at 279-82. Primarily
because of the United States Supreme Court's rejection of the federal equal protection claim
in Rodriguez, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that the state's system of financing public
schools-which produced gross expenditure disparities between property-wealthy and propertypoor districts, see Robinson I, 287 A.2d at 218-22-violated the New Jersey Constitution's
"thorough and efficient" clause, but not the state or federal Equal Protection Clause. In fact,
the New Jersey Supreme Court modified the constitutional basis of the lower court's ruling in
order to shield its decision from any possible hostile review by the United States Supreme
Court. Gibbons, 125 NJ. L.J. 1663 (1990) (surmising that the New Jersey court's decision in
Robinson I would presumably be shielded from United States Supreme Court review by the
"adequate and independent state grounds" rule). See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945).
By doing so, the New Jersey Supreme Court became the first in the nation to base its
opinion that the state's system of funding public schools was unconstitutional solely upon the
state constitution.
43. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
44. Robinson 1, 303 A.2d at 294. The term "equal educational opportunity" is widely
misunderstood. It does not mean that all students should receive the same education; instead,
it simply means that all children deserve "equality of opportunity through education." CooNs,
supra note 1, at 6. In other words, "[t]he crucial value to be preserved is the [equal] opportunity to succeed, not the uniformity of success." Id. at 3. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
45. Robinson I, 303 A.2d at 295.
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viable criterion for measuring compliance with the constitutional mandate."46 The primary symptom of the old financing system's constitutional deficiency was the gross disparities in per-pupil expenditures;
the primary cause of this constitutional deficiency was the "discordant
correlation . .. between the educational needs of the school districts
and their respective tax bases,"47 created by New Jersey's "substanupon local taxation" to fund the state's public
tial reliance ...
schools.4" This substantial reliance upon local taxation had "[saddled]
New Jersey with one of the highest local property tax rates in the
nation," a form of taxation that is "regressive" because of the effect
of marginal utility.4 9
Two months later, in June of 1973, the court decided to give the
Legislature a reasonable opportunity to comply with the constitutional
mandate of the "thorough and efficient" clause; therefore, it postponed
the issuance of any remedial order until January 1, 1975.5o By doing

46. IzL
47. Id at 297.
48. Robinson v. Cahill, 351 A.2d 713, 717 (N.J. 1975) (Robinson IV). As noted earlier,
this "substantial reliance . . .upon local taxation" was, until the 1970s, the norm for most, if
not all, states funding their public education systems with the foundation plan. See supra
notes 12 and accompanying text. At the time of Robinson I, local property taxes accounted
for 67% of New Jersey's public school expenditures, with the state providing only 28% of
the total (federal aid accounted for the other 5%). Robinson I, 303 A.2d at 276.
49. Ronald Sullivan, Jersey's High Court Tells State to Alter School Aid Pattern, N.Y.
TIMES, May 24, 1975, at Al; see also Robinson v. Cahill, 355 A.2d 129, 155, n. 18 (N.J.
1976) (Robinson V) (Conford, PJ.A.D., t/a, concurring in part) (quoting the Report of the
New Jersey Tax Policy Committee's assertion that New Jersey's property tax "is by all
measures either the highest or near-highest in the nation. It is harshly regressive.") (emphasis
added).
Marginal utility is the concept "that the poor districts are actually making [a] greater
effort than the rich when they have the same tax rate." COONS, supra note 1, at 222. In
essence, "the marginal utility effect makes a tax which is otherwise proportional really
regressive." Id. at 221. According to Coons, Clune, and Sugarman, "[i]t is easier to give 5%
of one's income to charity if one earns $100,000 a year than if $1,000. Even though the
dollar sacrifice is proportional. (and in absolute terms much greater for the richer person), the
demands on the other 95% are less for the richer man. He must give up fewer necessities-food, clothing, shelter-to make the [5%] contribution." Id. at 43-44 n.6. Therefore, if
both the poorer and richer districts tax their property at 2%, marginal utility increases the
burden upon the residents of the poorer district, assuming that poor people live in poor
districts. Moreover, the marginal utility burden upon the residents of poorer districts discourages them from raising taxes to match the per-pupil funding levels of the wealthier districts
because they will have to give up far more of life's necessities to do so.
50. Robinson v. Cahill, 306 A.2d 65 (NJ. 1973) (Robinson I). Originally, the trial
court had set the deadline for the passage of remedial legislation at January 1, 1973. See
Robinson v. Cahill, 287 A.2d 187, 217 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972); see also Robinson
v. Cahill, 289 A.2d 569 (N.J. Super Ct. Law Div. 1972) (refusing a request of the state
Attorney General to postpone the January 1, 1973 deadline). However, when the Supreme
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so, the supreme court displayed a considerable amount of patience,
judicial self-restraint, and deference to the Legislature's "fundamental
and primary" constitutional role in providing for the education of
New Jersey's children."1 The court's deferential attitude in Robinson
II clearly demonstrated its sensitivity to the fundamental separation-ofpowers issue lurking beneath the surface.52 But because it was highly unlikely that the New Jersey Legislature would heed the pleas of
the poorer districts for an equitable funding system that would significantly reduce the gross disparities in per-pupil expenditures, the practical-though certainly unintended-effect of the court's deference
was a four-year period of delay during which the state's schoolchildren received no remedy for the substantial violation of their fundamental constitutional right to a "thorough and efficient" education."
By January of 1975, the New Jersey Legislature had failed to
enact any law aimed at remedying the constitutional violation discov-

Court accepted the appeal, it "stayed the operation" of the trial court's order until it could
rule upon the case. Robinson I, 303 A.2d at 276.
51. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 367 (N.J. 1990) (Abbott II).
52. See Infra notes 167-225 and accompanying text. The separation of powers doctrine
finds explicit expression in the New Jersey Constitution: "The powers of the government shall be divided among three distinct branches, the legislative, executive,
and judicial. No person or persons belonging to or constituting one branch shall
exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as
expressly provided in this Constitution."
Robinson v. Cahill, 351 A.2d 713, 736 (N.J. 1975) (Robinson IV) (Mountain & Clifford, JJ.,
dissenting (quoting N.J. CONST. art. 1H1,para. 1). However, it is undoubtedly true that, "today
the doctrine of separation of powers cannot be said to require a complete
compartmentalization along triadic lines. More and more courts have come to recognize that
where a practical necessity exists, a blending of powers will be countenanced, but only so
long as checks and balances are present to guard against abuses." Robinson IV, 351 A.2d at
737 (Mountain & Clifford, JJ., dissenting) (emphasis in original). After all, "[t]he danger is
not blended power. The danger is unchecked power." Id
53. According to Chief Judge Gibbons, "[n]either in 1973, nor at any time since, was it
likely that a legislative majority would be sympathetic to urban pleas for a more progressive
tax which could eliminate disparities in per-pupil expenditures" between property-wealthy and
property-poor districts. Ironically, this is so primarily because, "as a result of Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), the reapportionment decision of the Warren Court, [the New
Jersey Legislature] came under increasing domination by [the] representatives of suburban
areas" during the 1960s. Gibbons, supra note 42, at 1663; see also COONS, supra note 1, at
xx. (stating that little in the way of a more equitable funding system could "be expected
from the political process in its [current] legislative mode.").
The Robinson plaintiffs and, in fact, all New Jersey schoolchildren, did not begin to
receive any remedy until the 1976-77 school year, more than four years after the trial court's
original determination that the then-existing public school financing system was unconstitutional,See Robinson v. Cahill, 355 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1976) (Robinson V) (upholding the facial
constitutionality of the Public School Education Act of 1975, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:7A-1
to -52 (West 1989)).
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ered in Robinson I.' And yet, despite the Legislature's failure to
comply with Robinson I after nearly two years, the supreme court
continued to display considerable deference to the Legislature, and to
the separation-of-powers principle, by further extending the deadline. 5 At the same time, the court scheduled oral argument for
March 18, 1975, to determine what relief was appropriate, as well as
what forms of relief it had the authority to order. 6
By the end of May, however, the court had clearly begun to lose
its patience with the Legislature's recalcitrance:
The Court has now come face to face with a constitutional exigency
involving, on a level of plain, stark and unmistakable reality, the
constitutional obligation of the Court to act. Having previously
identified a profound violation of [the plaintiffs'] constitutional right
[to a "thorough and efficient" education], based upon default in a
legislative obligation imposed by the organic law in the plainest of
terms, we have more than once stayed our hand, with appropriate
respect for the province of other Branches of government. In [the]
final alternative, we must now proceed to enforce the constitutional
right involved.57
Clearly, after "pausing in deference to the doctrine of separation of
powers" for over two years,58 the court concluded that "[t]he need
for immediate and affirmative judicial action" to remedy the constitutional violation was apparent.59 And yet, even as it finally acted to
remedy the "profound" violation of plaintiffs' fundamental right to a
"thorough and efficient" education, the New Jersey Supreme Court
continued to act with "restraint" and deference towards the LegislatureP° While it was certainly within the realm of the court's equitable powers to enjoin the distribution of all state education funding
under the 1970 Act found unconstitutional in Robinson I,6 the court
chose not to do so because of the "harmful impact on vital educational programs" that would have resulted.62 Instead, the court chose
a less drastic alternative: it ordered state executive officials to distrib-

54.
55.'
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Robinson v. Cahill, 335 A.2d 6 (N.J. 1975) (Robinson IH).
Id
Id at 7.
Robinson IV, 351 A.2d at 716.
Id at 717.
Id at 720.
Id at 724.
Id at 720.
id
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ute certain types of state aid found to violate the "thorough and efficient" clause-a total of approximately $300 million in state funding63-in accordance with the 1970 Act's incentive equalization formula for the 1976-77 school year, so as to reduce the gross disparities in per-pupil expenditures between property-wealthy and propertypoor districts.' Furthermore, based upon its reluctance to interfere

63. Id. at 722.
64. Id. at 721-22. Specifically, if the Legislature failed to enact remedial legislation by
October 1, 1975, the supreme court had ordered that state executive officials redistribute
.minimum support aid" and "save-harmless funds" through the 1970 Act's "incentive equalization aid formula" so as to reduce the gross disparities in per-pupil expenditures between
property-wealthy and property-poor districts.
In general, state aid to local school districts can be characterized in one of three
ways: equalizing, nonequalizing, or anti-equalizing. COONS, supra note 1, at 97-116. Equalizing state aid is money that, when given to local districts, decreases funding disparities
between wealthier and poorer districts. In other words, equalizing state aid is funding that
helps "poor districts overcome their poverty barrier." Id. at 98. In the comparison made
earlier between the Princeton and Trenton school districts, see supra note 39, the $182 per
pupil in foundation aid given to Trenton for the 1971-72 school year was equalizing state aid
because it reduced the large funding disparity between the wealthier district (Princeton) and
the poorer one (Trenton).
Unlike equalizing aid, nonequalizing state aid is money given to local districts that
neither increases nor decreases funding disparities between property-wealthy and property-poor
districts. Id. Non-equalizing state aid is money that increases the per-pupil expenditure level
of all districts by the same amount. The "minimum support aid" distributed under the 1970
Act declared unconstitutional in Robinson I was nonequalizing flat grant aid. A flat grant is
merely a uniform "amount of dollars per pupil" given to all districts. Id at 55. For the
1971-72 school year, minimum support aid in New Jersey was $100 per pupil for all districts. See Robinson v. Cahill, 287 A.2d 187, 190-91 (N.J. Super. 1972) (subsequent history
omitted). Thus, to continue the comparison of Princeton and Trenton as an example, during
the 1971-72 school year, Princeton had 4,025 enrolled pupils and Trenton had 17,501. l at
220. Therefore, for that school year, Princeton received $402,500 in minimum support aid and
Trenton received $1,750,100 in minimum support aid. Clearly, with this type of flat grant aid,
the only factor that determines how much "minimum support aid" a district receives is the
number of enrolled pupils. Thus, Trenton received more minimum support aid than Princeton
solely because it had more pupils to educate.
But if nonequalizing flat grant aid such as the minimum support aid distributed under
the 1970 Act appears not to have discriminated against poorer districts, why did the supreme
court in Robinson IV order the redistribution of that aid through the Act's incentive equalization formula for the 1976-77 school year? According to Coons, Clune, and Sugarman, "[the
evil of foundation plan dollars that are nonequalizing . . . [is] . . . clear. If this [state's]
foundation plan were to distribute all its dollars in an equalizing manner it could more
nearly approach a fair system while using the same amount of state money; state aid which
is nonequalizing in its effect could be redistributed so that it is equalizing under a plan with
a higher [guaranteed] foundation level." COONS, supra note 1, at 102-03 (emphasis added).
This is precisely what the supreme court sought to do in Robinson IV: had the court's order
taken effect, it would have raised the guaranteed foundation level by 60%-without increasing
the state share of public school funding. Robinson IV, 351 A.2d at 721.
Thus, the problem with nonequalizing flat grant aid such as minimum support aid is
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with the Legislature's primary role in providing for the education of
New Jersey's schoolchildren, as well as its continued adherence to the
separation-of-powers doctrine reflected in that reluctance, the supreme
court gave the Legislature four additional months to enact remedial
legislation before its order would become effective on October 1,
1975.65
Finally, on September 29, 1975, only two days before the court's
October 1 deadline, and almost four years after the trial court had
first ruled that the educational financing scheme of the 1970 Act was
unconstitutional, the Legislature passed the Public School Education
Act of 1975,6 which was "a substantial legislative reform in [the]
state supervision of local schools." 67 In addition, the 1975 Act contained a new funding equalization mechanism, enacted to reduce
substantially the gross disparities in per-pupil expenditures between
rich and poor districts. 68 New Jersey's recalcitrant Legislature, which
had stubbornly refused to comply with the constitutional mandate that
it provide all schoolchildren with a "thorough and efficient" education, finally acted to remedy the unconstitutional status quo.

not that it increases funding disparities between wealthier and poorer districts, but rather that
it fails to decrease those disparities. When a state like New Jersey already does so little (or
at least did so little prior to 1976) to help local school districts pay for public education, see
supra note 48, it is outrageous that any state aid dollars are given to wealthier districts,
especially when those districts clearly do not need such money. Id. at 108. Instead of giving
$402,500 in minimum support aid to a relatively wealthy district like Princeton, the state
could have given that money to a district that desparately needs it, like Trenton.
65. Robinson IV, 351 A.2d at 718 n.4. It is interesting to note that, despite the magnitude and unprecedented scope of the court's prospective injunction issued in Robinson IV,
advocates of school financing reform were clearly disappointed that the court did not order
the redistribution of all state aid to local districts-about $617 million for the 1976-77 school
year-through the 1970 Act's incentive equalization formula. Sullivan, supra note 49, at I,
59. New Jersey's governor at the time, Brendan Byme, advocated the enactment of a state
income tax for the first time to help pay for the increase in state aid required under the
Public School Education Act of 1975. Id. Governor Byme encountered fierce resistance from
the Legislature, which strongly opposed the passage of any state income tax. Id During the
oral argument for Robinson IV, Governor Byrne personally asked the court to redistribute all
$617 million in state aid to local districts through the incentive equalization formula. He did
so to obtain the means with which he might coerce the Legislature into enacting both a
fairer school finance formula and the more progressive income tax to pay for it. Id. The
supreme court's decision in Robinson IV not to redistribute all state aid, but only about half,
certainly disappointed Governor Byrne. Id
66. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:7A-1 to -52 (West 1989).
67. Gibbons, supra note 42, at 1663.
68. For a detailed description of the operation of the 1975 Act's funding provisions, see
infra notes 286-315 and accompanying text; see also Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 377-82
(N.J. 1990) (Abbott II).
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A number of parties challenged the constitutionality of the 1975
Act immediately following its passage. 9 But in Robinson V, decided
in January, 1976, a divided New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that the
1975 Act was "in all respects constitutional on its face, . . . assuming
it is fully funded."70 Unfortunately, the supreme court's decision in
Robinson V did not end this constitutional confrontation, because the
Legislature refused to fund fully the state aid provisions of the 1975
Act. In particular, the Legislature refused to provide the additional
$378 million required by the 1975 Act 71 because of its steadfast opposition to the enactment of a state income tax, which Governor
Byrne strongly supported. 2 The Governor saw a state income tax
not only as an important step in reforming New Jersey's "regressive
and unfair tax system," but also as a fairer method of collecting the
revenue that would help provide the substantially increased portions
of state aid to local districts required under the 1975 Act.73 When it
became clear that the Legislature would not, of its own volition, fund
the 1975 Act, the supreme court held yet another oral argument in
March of 1976 on "an order to show cause why certain specific
relief, or other relief, including injunctive relief, should not be mandated."74 The court had a number of different types of injunctive
relief at its disposal. It could have empowered the state Board of
Education to levy additional property taxes, enjoined the collection of
local property taxes and replaced them by authorizing the Board of
Education to levy a uniform state tax,75 ordered the state to take
money from other state agencies and use that money for education, or
it could have enjoined the payment of any money for education under
the unconstitutional funding system-in effect, closing the state's
schools.76 Most people considered the last option-closing the state's
schools until the Legislature funded the 1975 Act-the most drastic,
and unlikely, option that the court could have chosen.'

69. Robinson v. Cahill, 355 A.2d 129, 131 (N.' 1976) (Robinson V).
70. Id at 139 (emphasis added).
71. Alfonso A. Narvaez, Jersey Schools Closed by Court Order, N.Y. TIMEs, July 1,
1976, at Al.
72. Id
73. Sullivan, supra note 49, at 1, 59; see generally supra note 49.
74. Robinson v. Cahill, 358 A.2d 457, 459 (N.. 1976) (Robinson VI).
75. See Robinson VI, 358 A.2d at 170 (Pashman, J., dissenting).
76. Martin Waldron, Schools in Jersey Face July Closing, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1976,
at A23.
77. Id At the time, it seemed highly unlikely that the court would choose its most
drastic option and close the state's schools because it had continuously provided the Legisla-

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol20/iss2/6

18

Lichtenstein: Abbott v. Burke: Reaffirming New Jersey's Constitutional Commitme
1991]

EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNI7Y

To the suprise of nearly everyone familiar with Robinson v.
Cahill, the New Jersey Supreme Court did just that. On May 13,
1976, it enjoined state or local officials from distributing any money
for education (with very limited exceptions) beginning July 1, if the
Legislature failed, by that date, to provide full funding for the 1975
Act.78 By doing so, the court abruptly abandoned its deferential attitude and placed "the school crisis squarely in the lap of the Legislature." 79 The court's tone changed dramatically; it clearly had lost
its patience with the Legislature's recalcitrance: "The continuation of
the existing unconstitutional system of financing the schools into yet
another school year cannot be tolerated. It is the Legislature's responsibility to create a constitutional system .... The Legislature has not
yet met this constitutional obligation. Accordingly, we shall enjoin the
existing unconstitutional method of public school financing.""0 Of
course, the Court's injunction would take effect on July 1, 1976, only
if the Legislature failed to act.8 '
To the suprise of almost no one familiar with Robinson v.
Cahill, the Legislature did not comply with the mandate of Robinson
VI: it failed to enact full funding for the 1975 Act before July 1.82
Because of that failure, the supreme court's conditional injunction
automatically took effect and the state's schools were closed.8" Like
Hamlet endlessly pondering how to avenge his father's murder, the
New Jersey Legislature endlessly pondered whether to tax or not to
tax. In the meantime, it produced plenty of rhetoric but no positive
action." Finally, on July 7, the Assembly broke the deadlock and
passed a bill containing the state's first income tax." When the Sen-

ture with considerable deference throughout the history of Robinson v. Cahill. See supra notes
50-65 and accompanying text.
78. Robinson VI, 358 A.2d at 457 (N.J. 1976).
79. Waldron, supra note 76, at 23.
80. Robinson VI, 358 A.2d at 459.
81. Id at 460.
82. Alfonso Narvaez, Jersey Schools Closed by Court Order, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1976,
at Al.
83. Id On June 30, 1975, the day before the New Jersey Supreme Court's injunction
was to take effect, a special 11-judge federal court refused to stay the supreme court's
injunction. Id By a 9-2 vote, the special federal court, which consisted of all federal judges
assigned to the state, concluded that it "should not force New Jersey to perpetuate an unconstitutional system" of financing public education. Id at 32.
84. Alfonso Narvaez, Jersey Schools Still Shut As Assembly Fails to Act, N.Y. TIMES,
July 7, 1976, at Bi.
85. Alfonso Narvaez, Jersey Assembly, Ending Deadlock, Votes Income Tax, N.Y. TIMs,
July 8, 1976, at Al.
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ate quickly followed suit on July 8, Governor Byrne immediately
signed the bill into law.86 After more than a dozen attempts to pass
an income tax" and years of "intense resistance"88 to it, the Legislature finally enacted the bills that would provide full funding for the
Public School Education Act of 1975.89 At the Governor's request,
the supreme court lifted its injunction on July 9, officially ending its
constitutional confrontation with the Legislature. 9°
III.

SEPARATION OF POWERS VS. CHECKS AND BALANCES:
WHEN MUST THE COURTS ACT?

A.

Separation of Powers

1. Political Questions
More than any other first-generation public school finance reform
dispute, 9' the marathon litigation that comprised Robinson v.
Cahil92 repeatedly forced the Supreme Court of New Jersey to grapple with profound separation-of-powers issues.93 At the center of the
separation-of-powers conflict in Robinson was the question of what
authority, if any, the supreme court possessed to remedy the violation

86. Alfonso A. Narvaez, New Jersey Votes State Income Tax; Byrne Signs Bill,
N.Y. TIMEs, July 9, 1976, at Al.
87. It at B2.
88. Id. at Al.
89. IA
90. See Robinson v. Cahill, 360 A.2d 400 (N.J. 1976).
91. For purposes of this Note, a first-generation case such as Robinson v. Cahill is
defined as a case in which a court rules upon the constitutionality of the state's then-existing
public school financing scheme for the first time. In other words, the specific issue
raised-whether the current system of school financing complies with the constitutional
mandate-is one of first impression in the jurisdiction. As the supreme court noted in Abbott
v. Burke, New Jersey "is the only state involved in a second round on this issue." Abbott v.
Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 373 (N.J. 1990) (Abbott I).
92. See supra notes 35-90 and accompanying text. One commentator aptly likened
Robinson v. Cahill to Jarndyce and Jarndyce, the seemingly endless litigation at the center of
the Charles Dickens novel Bleak House. See Thro, supra note 2, at 1645 n.26.
93. See, e.g., Robinson 11, 306 A.2d 65 (N.J. 1973) (deferring to the Legislature's
primary responsibility to provide for the education of New Jersey's schoolchildren by postponing the issuance of any remedial order until January 1, 1975); Robinson I, 335 A.2d 6
(NJ. 1975) (postponing again the issuance of a remedial order); Robinson IV, 351 A.2d 713
(N.J. 1975) (ordering redistribution of minimum support aid and save-harmless funds through
the 1970 Act's incentive equalization provision for 1976-77 school year because, in the face
of continued legislative inaction, supreme court had no alternative); Robinson VI, 358 A.2d
457 (N.J. 1976) (enjoining all state and local officials from expending any funds on public
education after June 30, 1976 if the Legislature failed to provide full funding for the Public
School Education Act of 1975).
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of plaintiffs' fundamental right to a "thorough and efficient" education
when the New Jersey Constitution specifically imposed upon the
Legislature the duty to provide for the education of the state's schoolchildren.94 No one involved in Robinson v. Cahill, however, seriously questioned the authority of the supreme court to rule upon the
constitutionality of the then-existing statutory scheme for financing
public education in New Jersey.' 5
But the defendants in a number of other public school finance
cases did just that. Specifically, the defendants in those other cases
argued that public school finance reform disputes presented a
nonjusticiable "political question,"96 one that the judiciary should not
entertain because of "the difficulty and complexity of education issues
and the controversial nature of tinkering with the goals of public
education" established by the Legislature.97 Those defendants also
pointed to "constitutional language apparently favoring exclusive
legislative responsibility for education."98 In short, they argued that
the separation-of-powers principle embodied in the "political question"
doctrine99 barred the judiciary from considering the constitutionality
of legislatively enacted public education finance systems.
Until December of 1991, every court to which defendants presented this "political question" argument patently rejected it."° But
in Reform Education Financing Inequities Today (R.E.F..T.) v.
Cuomo, 1 ' the most recent constitutional challenge to New York's

94. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
95. The doctrine of judicial review was first established in New Jersey in 1780, in the
case of Holmes v. Walton-twenty three years before the United States Supreme Court
decided Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 13 (11th ed. 1985). See State v. Parkhurst, 9 NJ.L. 427, 442-45 (1802).
96. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208-37 (1962).
97. Hubsch, supra note 2, at 115.
98. Id
99. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217 (holding that the nonjusticiability of a political question
is "essentially a function of separation of powers.").
100. Hubsch, supra note 2, at 115-16. See McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 157
(Ga. 1981) (stating, "[i]ndeed, "[w]e know of no sister State which has refused merits treatment to such issues, and we would regard our own refusal to adjudicate plaintiffs' claim of
constitutional infringement an abdication of our constitutional duties.'") (quoting Board of
Educ., Levittown v. Nyquist, 443 N.Y.S.2d 843 (1981); see also Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v.
State, 585 P.2d 71, 87 (wash. 1978) (concluding that -the judiciary has the ultimate power
and the duty to interpret, construe and give meaning to words, sections and articles of the
constitution" because "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is") (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974) and Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803))).
101. 578 N.Y.S.2d 969 (Sup. Ct. 1991).
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"chaotic and unjust ' c° system of financing public education," °3
the trial judge granted defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint
because the plaintiffs' claims raised a nonjusticiable political question." 4 While the trial judge never actually stated in so many words
that he was granting the defendants' motion to dismiss because the
complaint presented a nonjusticiable question, the implication is unmistakable and clear."5 For a number of reasons, it is likely that
the trial judge incorrectly granted the defendants' motion to dismiss
the complaint in R.E..IT v. Cuomo." 6

102. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 59 (1973) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
103. See Sam Howe Verhovek, Poorer New York School Districts Challenging State Aid
as Unequal, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1991, at Al.
104. RE.F..T., 578 N.Y.S.2d at 974-76.
105. Near the end of his opinion, Justice Roberto quoted extensively from the footnote
that ends the Court of Appeals' opinion in Board of Educ., Levittown v. Nyquist, the first
challenge to New York's system of financing public education. R.E.F.LT., 578 N.Y.S.2d at
976. In that footnote, the Court of Appeals, speaking through Judge Jones, provided some of
the reasons why it rejected plaintiffs' claims that New York's system of financing public
education violated the education clause of the state's constitution. In particular, Judge Jones
stated that complaints about the inequities of the state's public school financing scheme "are
properly to be addressed to the Legislature for its consideration and weighing in the discharge of its obligation to provide for the maintenance and support of our State's educational
system. Primary responsibility for the provision of fair and equitable educational opportunity
within the financial capabilities of our State's taxpayers unquestionably rests with that branch
of our government." Board of Educ., Levittown v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 369 n.9 (N.Y.
1982) (emphasis added). Justice Roberto identified this footnote as the "philosophical underpinning of the Levittown decision." RE.F.IT., 578 N.Y.S.2d at 976. The clear implication of
the quoted portion of the footnote is that it is for the New York Legislature to decide how
best to provide for the education of the state's schoolchildren. Undoubtedly, this is
true-which is why the education article, (N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1) unequivocally places
that duty upon the Legislature. But as I will show below (see infra notes 107-162 and
accompanying text), it does not follow that the plaintiffs' claims in RE.F.I.T v. Cuomo
present the court with a nonjusticiable political question.
106. To begin with, there is little, if anything, in Board of Educ., Levittown v. Nyquist,
439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982) (the 1982 decision of the New York Court of Appeals rejecting
claims that the New York system of financing public schools violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the federal or state Constitution, or the education clause of the state constitution)
to support Justice Roberto's ruling that R.E.F.LT v. Cuomo is not justiciable. First, in
Levittown, the Court of Appeals ruled upon the merits of the plaintiffs' claims. This clearly
indicates that legislative actions taken pursuant to the education clause of the New York
Constitution "are not automatically immune from judicial review." Powell v. McCormack, 395
U.S. 486, 519 n.40 (1969). Second, the actual language of the court's opinion in Levittown
unequivocally supports the proposition that RE.F.I.T. v. Cuomo presents a justiciable controversy:
With full recognition and respect, however, for the distribution of powers in educational matters among the legislative, executive and judicial branches, it is nevertheless the responsibility of the courts to adjudicate contentions that actions taken by
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According to Professor Tribe, "one should not accept lightly the
proposition [of the "political question" doctrine] that there are provisions of the Constitution which the courts may not independently
interpret, since it is plainly inconsistent with Marbury v. Madison's
basic assumption that the Constitution is judicially declarable
law."" ° Clearly, then, if "we make the initial assumption that judicial review plays a legitimate role in a constitutional democracy,"10 8

the Legislature and executive fail to conform to the mandates of the Constitutions
which constrain the activities of all three branches.
Levittown, 439 N.E.2d at 363. Third, the Court of Appeals explicitly defined the constitutional
standard of the education clause as being one that guarantees "fair and equitable educational
opportunity" to the state's children. Id at 369, n.9. Clearly, then, there is no "lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving" the issue raised in
RE.F.I.T.-whether New York's current system of financing public education violates the
state constitution's education clause. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). Unfortunately,
Justice Roberto found otherwise: "We cannot possibly infer a true standard from the broad
language of the education article, adopted in 1894." R.E.F.I.T., 578 N.Y.S.2d at 973. For a
more complete response to Justice Roberto's finding about the inability to "infer a true
standard from the broad language of the education article," see infra notes 151-62 and
accompanying text.
In his opinion, Justice Roberto identified as the "philosophical underpinning of the
Levittown decision," R.E.F.T., 578 N.Y.S.2d at 976, the deference that the Court of Appeals
showed to the Legislature, whose "primary responsibility" it is to provide the state's children
with a "fair and equitable educational opportunity." Levittown, 439 N.E.2d at 369 n.9. While
this is undoubtedly true, it appears that Justice Roberto did not heed the admonition of
Professor Martin Redish with respect to judicial deference to the expertise-in this case, the
educational expertise-of the legislature:
[I]t is vital to distinguish between appropriate "substantive" deference-in which
the judiciary, while retaining power to render final decisions on the meaning of the
constitutional limits, nevertheless takes into account the need for expertise or quick
action-and unacceptable total "procedural" deference, where the court concludes
simply that resort to the judiciary constitutes the wrong "procedure," because the
decision is exclusively that of the political branches.
Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the "Political Question," 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1031,
1048-49 (1985). While the Court of Appeals did defer to the expertise of the Legislature in
Levittown, it exercised what Professor Redish has termed "substantive" deference by specifically reserving the right to strike down any legislatively enacted educational scheme that
produces -gross and glaring inadequacy." Levittown, 439 N.E.2d at 369. In his opinion
granting the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint for nonjusticiability, Justice Roberto
mentioned this deference exercised by the Court of Appeals in Levittown. See R.E.F.I.T, 578
N.Y.S.2d at 973. But by dismissing the complaint for nonjusticiability, Justice Roberto
exercised "procedural" deference, which Professor Redish maintains the judiciary should never
do.
107. LAURENCE H. TRAE, AMERICAN CONSTTUTIONAL LAW 97 (2d ed. 1988).
108. Redish, supra note 106, at 1059. According to Professor Redish, the legitimate role
"of unrepresentative judicial review [in a constitutional democracy] is to assure that the
Constitution restrains majority will." Id. at 1045. Otherwise, "[i]f the majoritarian branches
could act as final arbiters of the limits of their own power, there would have been little
purpose in imposing supermajoritarian constitutional limitations in the first place." Id at 1045-
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the "political question" doctrine must be viewed as a narrow exception to the general rule of Marbury v. Madison that the Constitution
is judicially declarable law."° In fact, according to the United
States Supreme Court, unless at least one of the six formulations of
the "political question" doctrine-which the Court authoritatively
clarified and catalogued in Baker v. Carr"-"is inextricable from
the case at bar, there should be no dismissal for nonjusticiability on
the ground of a political question's presence.". 1 Therefore, we must
examine individually the two formulations of the "political question"
doctrine that most readily apply to public school finance reform cases-the "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of [an]
issue to a coordinate political department" and the "lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it"1 1 -as well
as general considerations of non-justiciability."'
a. Textually Demonstrable Constitutional Commitment
One primary argument in favor of the position that public school
finance reform cases present courts with nonjusticiable political questions is that "constitutional language apparently favoring exclusive
legislative responsibility for education" 14 amounts to a "textually
demonstrable constitutional committment"' 5 to the legislature of any
dispute about the equity of the state's educational financing system.
In other words, because most education clauses in state constitutions
speak only to the legislature's duty and responsibility to "provide" for

46.
109. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (holding that "[i]t is

emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
110. 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). According to the Court,

[p]rominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable stan-

dards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Id.
111.

Id.

112.
113.
114.
115.

Id
See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 517 (1969).
Hubsch, supra note 2, at 115.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
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the education of the state's schoolchildren," 6 while none mentions
any authority in the judiciary to review the constitutionality of the
legislature's chosen method of providing for education, there must be
no such authority vested in the judiciary. When examined more closely, it becomes clear that this argument "represents a fundamentally
flawed view of the concept of judicial review.""' 7
According to Professor Redish,
[i]t is difficult to construe a constitutional provision as excluding
judicial review on the basis of the facts that (1) the courts are not
mentioned, and (2) other branches are mentioned . .. because the
power of the judiciary to engage in judicial review is not explicitly
mentioned in any constitutional provision."'
In other words, "no constitutional provision describing legislative or
executive power expressly [provides for] judicial power to review the
constitutionality of the exercise of those powers.""..9 So "the mere
fact that a constitutional provision expressly refers to the exercise of
power by the political branches but not to the review role of the
judicial branch cannot justify an abdication of the review function
120
since judicial review is nowhere mentioned in the Constitution."'
If the lack of any explicit mention of judicial review in the education
clauses of state constitutions 12 turns the questions raised in public
school finance reform cases like R.E.F..T v. Cuomo'2 into
nonjusticiable political questions, "virtually every challenge to the
constitutionality of a statute would be a political question." 1 3 In
effect, the political question doctrine, the narrow exception to the
general rule of Marbury v. Madison that "the Constitution is judicially
declarable law," would swallow the general rule of judicial re-

116. See Hubsch, supra note 2, at 134-40.
117. Redish, supra note 106, at 1033.
118. Id at 1040 (emphasis in original).
119. Id at 1036 (emphasis added).
120. Id at 1042 (emphasis in original); see also id at 1060 (stating that "[t]he fact that
a provision vesting power refers to the political branches and not to the judiciary cannot
justify a finding of a textual commitment of discretion to the political branches, because the
same could be said of virtually every provision vesting authority in a political branch.").

121. See supra note 2.
122. 578 N.Y.S.2d 969 (Sup. Ct. 1991).
123. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941 (1983); see also Washakie County Sch. Dist.
No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 318 (Wyo. 1980), cerr. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980)
(holding that "[t]his is no more a political question than any other challenge to the constitutionality of statutes.").
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view. 124 To suppose that the judiciary has no authority to determine
whether legislative enactments that provide for public school fimancing
comply with or violate constitutional mandates "is to suppose that,
under the sanction of the constitution, [the legislature] might defeat
the constitution itself.' ' lss
While no state court has ruled that "constitutional language apparently favoring exclusive legislative responsibility for education " "
amounts to a "textually demonstrable constitutional committment"' 7
to the legislature of any dispute about the equity of the state's educational financing system, the defendants in Powell v.
McCornack 2 presented virtually identical arguments (albeit in an
entirely different context) to the United States Supreme Court. In
Powell, the defendants argued that the seemingly unambiguous language of Article I, Section 5-that "Each House [of Congress] shall
Qualifications of its own Membe the Judge of the ...
2
bers" -plainly was, on its face, a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment " 130 to the House of Representatives that "automatically" precluded "judicial review" 31 of the House's decision to
exclude Adam Clayton Powell from taking the seat in Congress to
which he was duly elected.' 32 The Supreme Court rejected the
defendants' argument that a "textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment"-even one as apparantly clear as the one in Article I,
Section 5-"automatically" precluded "judicial review":
In order to determine whether there has been a textual commitment
to a co-ordinate department of the Government, we must interpret
the Constitution. In other words, we must first determine what pow-

124. TRIBE, supra note 107, at 97.
125.

Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S.

(1 Wheat.) 304, 329 (1816); see also Redish,

supra note 106, at 1050 (stating that, "in general the judiciary must have the final say as to
the constitutionality of the activities of the political branches, primarily for the reason that the
political branches should not be permitted to sit in final judgement on the constitutionality of
their own actions."); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-04 (1974); Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486," 518-22 (1969).
126. Hubsch, supra note 2, at 115.
127. Baker v. Car, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
128. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
129. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
130. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
131. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 519 n.40 (1969).
132. Powell was being investigated for misappropriation of House funds and for abusing
the process of New York courts. Id. at 492. Based upon the evidence supporting these

allegations, the House passed a resolution excluding Powell from taking his congressional seat
in the 90th Congress. Id.
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er the Constitution confers upon the House through Art. I, § 5, before we can determine to what extent, if any, the exercise of that
power is subject to judicial review.'
Furthermore, because the Supreme Court is the "ultimate interpreter

of the Constitution,"" it is the final arbiter of "whether a matter
has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another
branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds

whatever authority has been committed."' 35 According to Professor
Redish, "perhaps the only constitutional provision that actually may
be thought to provide a textual basis for excluding judicial review is
article

I,

§5 ...

136

Assuming

that

is

true,

Powell

v.

McCormack's holding "that actions allegedly taken pursuant to Art. 1,
§ 5, are not automatically immune from judicial review"'

37

essen-

tially eviscerated the "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment" formulation of the political question doctrine, at least where
judicial review of the federal constitution is concerned.
Of course, Powell v. McCormack is not binding authority upon
the state courts when they interpret and rule upon claims made under
state constitutional provisions. But its rationale is readily applicable to
the resolution of the political question issue-at least the "textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment"1 3 formulation of the political question doctrine-described earlier"39 and implicitly raised in
RE.F.LT. v. Cuomo:14

whether state "constitutional language appar-

133. Id at 519. According to the Court, "[i]f examination of § 5 disclosed that the
Constitution gives the House judicially unreviewable power to set qualifications for membership and to judge whether prospective members meet those qualifications, further review of
the House determination [to exclude Powell] might well be barred by the political question
doctrine." Id. at 520. However, after conducting an extensive examination of the historical
precedents of Section 5, id. at 522-47, the Court concluded that "the *textual commitment'
formulation of the political question doctrine [did] not bar federal courts from adjudicating
[Powell's] claims" because "Art. I, § 5, is at most a 'textually demonstrable comitment' to
Congress to judge only the [standing] qualifications expressly set forth in the Constitution."
Id. at 548. Therefore, because all parties agreed that Powell met the standing qualifications-age, citizenship, and residency-set forth in Art. I, § 2, and because he "was duly
elected by the voters of the 18th Congressional District of New York," the Supreme Court
ruled that "the House was without power to exclude him from its membership." Id. at 550.
134. Id at 521 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962)).
135. Id
136. Redish, supra note 106, at 1036 n.37.
137. Powell, 395 U.S. at 519 n.40.
138. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
139. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
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ently favoring exclusive legislative responsibility for education"'' 442'
amounts to a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment'
that automatically bars judicial review of the method the legislature
has chosen to finance public education.
Article I, Section 5, the constitutional provision at issue in
Powell, clearly contains some type of textually demonstrable commitment to Congress of the power to judge the "qualifications of its
own members."' 143 But on its face, Section 5 does not say what
"qualifications" each House of Congress has the power to judge. Had
the Supreme Court ruled in Powell that the mere existence of a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department"' 44 automatically precluded judicial review of Congressman Powell's claim, had it not examined the scope
and degree of Article I, Section 5's textually demonstrable commitment, but instead assumed that Section 5 automatically granted the
House "unreviewable discretion" 145 to judge any and all qualifications of its members, the House of Representatives would have been
left as the final judge of the constitutionality of its own action to
exclude Powell from the 90th Congress. This result would have been
clearly intolerable, because "[i]f the majoritarian branches [of government] could act as final arbiters of the limits of their own power,
supermajoritarian constituthere would [be] little purpose in imposing
46
tional limitations in the first place."'
For the same reasons, it would be clearly intolerable to let state
legislatures have "unreviewable discretion 4 7 to determine if their
actions comply with constitutional mandates. In particular, the education provisions of most state constitutions impose an affirmative duty' upon the legislature to establish or provide for the type of edu141. Hubsch, supra note 2, at 115.
142. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
143. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl.1.
144. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
145. TRIBE, supra note 107, at 104.
146. Redish, supra note 106, at 1045-46. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. It
is equally important to note that, if Article I, Section 5, does give each House of Congress
"unreviewable discretion," TRIBE, supra note 107, at 104, to exclude a member for any reason-a position flatly rejected in Powell-Article I, Section 5, would frequently conflict with
the unequivocal mandate in Article I, Section 2, that "t]he House of Representatives shall be

composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several States." (emphasis added). Taken to its extreme, Congress, and not "wethe People," would have ultimate

power to decide who sits in Congress-a concept completely inconsistent with the very idea
of a representative democracy.
147. TRIE, supra note 107, at 104.
148. See, e.g., Rose v. Council For Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 211 (Ky. 1989)
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cation specified by that provision-whether it be "thorough and efficient" 49 or some other specification. While the role of legislatures
in providing for, or establishing, the constitutionally mandated type of
educational system undoubtedly must be "fundamental and primary,9" it simply does not follow that a constitutional mandate that
imposes an affirmative duty upon the legislature to provide for the
education of the state's children also grants the legislature "unreviewable" authority to determine when it has complied with that constitutional mandate.
b.

Lack of Judicially Discoverable or
Manageable Standards

The other primary argument in favor of the position that public
school finance reform cases present courts with nonjusticiable political
questions is that "the constitutional provisions which litigants would
invoke as guides to resolution of the issue do not lend themselves to
judicial application." 151 In other words, state constitutional education
provisions "do not lend themselves to the development of workable,
generalizable standards of construction" that would help courts resolve
the issues presented in public school finance reform cases. 5 2 As
Professor Redish demonstrates, this "absence-of-standards" rationale
cannot be taken seriously. 153 Where in the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment does it mention "strict scrutiny"" or
"rational basis?" 155 Where in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does it mention "fair play and substantial justice?" 156 Obviously, the Constitution mentions none of these well

(stating that "[t]he sole responsibility for providing the system of common schools is that of
our General Assembly. It is a duty-it is a constitutional mandate placed by the people on
the 138 members of that body who represent those selfsame people.") (emphasis added); see
also Robinson v. Cahill, 358 A.2d 457, 459 (N.J. 1976) (Robinson VI) (noting that the
constitutional mandate, the "thorough and efficient" clause, places a "responsibility" and an
"obligation" upon the Legislature to create a "thorough and efficient" public school system).
149. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
150. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 367 (N.J. 1990) (Abbott n).
151. TRIBE, supra note 107, at 99; see also Redish, supra note 106, at 1046 (stating that
"[p]erhaps the most widely cited ground in support of the prudential [version of the political
question] doctrine is the view that certain constitutional provisions do not lend themselves to
the development of workable generalizable standards of construction.").
152. Redish, supra note 106, at 1046.
153. Id at 1046-50.
154. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
155. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
156. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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known phrases, but courts have managed to use them to apply such
vague terms as "equal protection of the laws" and "due process of
law."157 As Professor Redish points out, "[c]ourts are often called
upon to apply generalized and ambiguous abstract principles to specific factual situations, even when the application of those principles is
unclear."1 58 If a court wants to construe the education clause of a
state constitution, it can, because "[u]ltimately, any constitutional
provision can be supplied with working standards of interpretation. , 159 One need only look to public school finance reform cases
recently decided by the Supreme Court of New Jersey"s° or the Supreme Court of Texas' for guidance and inspiration on how to
construe education clauses. Also, equal educational opportunity-the
concept central to both cases-would provide an excellent guide62
post.
c.

General Considerations of Justiciability

According to the United States Supreme Court, "[i]n deciding
generally whether a claim is justiciable, a court must determine
whether 'the duty asserted can be judicially identified and its breach
judicially determined, and whether protection for the right asserted
can be judicially molded." ' 163 As established earlier, "the duty asserted" in this case-the affirmative duty of the legislature to provide
for the education of the state's children as mandated by the state
constitution's education clause-can be judicially identified. 64 Similarly, the judiciary can determine whether the legislature has breached
its constitutionally imposed duty to provide for the education of the
state's children in the manner specified by the education clause."6
157. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
158. Redish, supra note 106, at 1050.
159. Id. at 1047 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 1046-47 (noting that, "whenever
the Court truly desires, it can find workable-if not perfect-standards of application in interpreting exceedingly vague constitutional language.").
160. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990) (Abbott 1).
161. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
162. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
163. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. at 517 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198
(1962)).
164. See supra notes 151-62 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 43-45 and
accomanying text.
165. See supra notes 107-50 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 303
A.2d 273 (N.J.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973) (Robinson I) (holding that the New Jersey
Legislature did not satisfy its constitutional duty to provide all schoolchildren with a "thorough and efficient" education).
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However, in the context of public school finance reform litigation, the
question of "whether protection for the right asserted can be judicially
molded" presents a far more complex separation-of-powers issue'"
than the political question issue discussed above. In order to understand fully the complexities of this issue, a further examination of the
separation-of-powers doctrine and its relationship to the doctrine of
checks and balances is necessary.
B.

Separation of Powers vs. Checks and Balances

Under one widely accepted definition of separation of powers,
"[o]ne branch [of government] is not permitted to encroach on the
domain or exercise the powers of another branch."167 In other
words, "each [branch of government] .

.

. must not interfere with the

functioning of the others." 68 According to Justice Brandeis, "[t]he
doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted ... not to promote
efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was not to avoid friction but, by means of the inevitable friction
incident to the distribution of the governmental 1 powers
among three
69
autocracy."
from
people
the
save
to
departments,
In order to determine whether an action taken by one branch
violates the separation-of-powers principle embodied within the very
structure of the Constitution, the United States Supreme Court defines
the separation-of-powers limits upon the scope of one branch's authority by comparatively articulating the powers that the Constitution
confers upon the other branches.' 70 For instance, in Kilbourn v.
Thompson,'7 ' a case involving the scope of congressional power to
hold an uncooperative witness in contempt, "the Supreme Court demonstrated how the nature of one branch's function is used to mark the
limit of another branch's function: '[T]he House of Representatives
not only exceeded the limit of its own authority, but assumed a pow-

166. Specifically, that issue concerns what remedy, if any, a court may grant to plaintiffs
once it concludes that the current public school financing scheme is unconstitutional in light
of the indisputable fact that -[t]he Legislature's role in education is fundamental and primary." Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 367 (NJ. 1990) (Abbott II).
167.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1225 (6th ed. 1990).

168. Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REv. 661, 682 (1978).
169. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
170. Nagel, supra note 168, at 667. (explaining that "[s]eparation of powers means that
the powers delegated to each branch of the . . . government are measured in part by contrast
to the powers delegated to the other branches.").
171.

103 U.S. 168 (1880).
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er which could only be properly exercised by another branch of the
government, because it was in its nature clearly judicial."" 7 2 Similarly, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,' the Steel Seizure case, the Supreme Court invalidated a presidential order that
directed the Secretary of Commerce to take control of the country's
steel mills and ensure that they continued operation because President
Truman's order "amount[ed] to lawmaking, a legislative function
which the Constitution has expressly confided to the Congress." 74
Also, under the political question doctrine,175 the judiciary should
not exercise its otherwise valid authority to adjudicate a case or controversy if one or more of the six formulations of that doctrine "is
inextricable from the case at bar." 176 According to Justice Brennan,
who wrote for the Court in Baker v. Carr, "[t]he nonjusticiability of
a political question is primarily a function of the separation of powers." 77 But it is important to keep in mind that, as demonstrated
earlier, the political question doctrine does not bar the judiciary from
exercising its power of judicial review to determine whether a public
school finance system violates the state's constitution. 7 '
By contrast, "the doctrine of checks and balances buttresses the
conceptual distinctions among the functions of government by providing for direct intervention by each branch into the functioning of the
others; power can be checked only if it is shared." 179 In other
words, "[t]he different governmental departments must necessarily
affect the internal operations of the other branches because the checks
imposed by the Constitution cannot be effective unless they have an
'external' impact."' ° But this assertion seems clearly inconsistent
with the previous assertion that "each [branch of government] must

172. Nagel, supra note 168, at 667 n.43 (quoting Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168,
192 (1880)); see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 960 (1983) (Powell, J.,concurring in
the judgment) (stating that, "[w]hen Congress finds that a particular person does not satisfy
the statutory criteria for permanent residence in this country it has assumed a judicial function in violation of the principle of separation of powers.").
173. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
174. Id. at 582.
175. See supra notes 107-62 and accompanying text; see also TRBE, supra note 107, at
97-107.
176. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). see also supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
177. Baker, 369 U.S. at 210.
178, See supra notes 91-166 and accompanying text.
179. Nagel, supra note 168, at 682.
180. Id. at 693-94.
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not interfere with the functioning of the other.''. In fact, the inconsistency appears to be so fundamental that reconciliation of these
principles might seem impossible. How is a branch of government
supposed to act when, while the separation-of-powers principle instructs it "not [to] interfere with the functioning of the other" branches, the checks-and-balances doctrine instructs it to intervene directly
"into the functioning of the others?"
In part, the answer to this question is that, while the concepts of
separation of powers and checks and balances are "contradictory in
substance," they are nonetheless usually "consistent in purpose."' 82
Unfortunately, the apparent contradiction between these two concepts
has sometimes resulted in confusion as to which concept should
achieve what purpose.'83 For example, in Board of Education v.
Walter,'s the Supreme Court of Ohio upheld the constitutionality of
that state's public school financing scheme. In concluding that the
case presented a justiciable controversy and was not barred by the
political question doctrine, the court held that "[o]ne of the basic
functions of the courts under our system of separation of powers is to
compel the other branches of government to conform to the [Constitution]."' 8 5 But as the decisions of other state high courts make clear,
this assertion "represents a fundamentally flawed view of the concept
of judicial review."'186 As the Supreme Court of Wyoming correctly
pointed out in Washakie County School District No. One v.
Herschler,'87 judicial review "is a power vested in the courts as one
of the checks and balances contemplated by the division of government into three departments."' 8 8 While it is easy to confuse the
concepts of separation of powers and checks and balances' 89 and to
employ them interchangeably, courts should not do so. Sometimes,
the concepts are contradictory in both purpose and operation."O

181. Id. at 682 (citation omitted).
182. Id. The ultimate purpose of both concepts is to prevent the "tyrannical use of power." Id.
183.

Id. "Itis almost an American tradition . . . to confuse the doctrines . . . ." Id.

184. 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979).
185. Id. at 823 (quoting State v. Masterson, 183 N.E.2d 376, 379 (Ohio 1962)).
186. Redish, supra note 108, at 1033.
187. 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
188. Id at 318 (emphasis added).
189. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
190. The best example of this is Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). In Powell,
the United States Supreme Court ruled that, even though Article I, Section 5, was a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment that granted to each House of Congress the authority

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1991

33

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 6
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:429

C. A Revisionist Review of Robinson v. Cahill
In Robinson IV,' 91 the Supreme Court of New Jersey confronted a situation in which separation of powers and checks and balances
pulled in opposite directions. As the court correctly noted, its "function is to appraise compliance with the Constitution, not to legislate
93 the court conan educational system . . . ."92 In Robinson I,1
cluded that the then-existing system of financing New Jersey's public
schools 1" did not comply with the mandate of the "thorough and
efficient" clause-that the Legislature provide all children with "equal
educational opportunity. " 95 But "[t]he Legislature's role in educa97
tion is fundamental and primary."" Therefore, in Robinson H,'
the supreme court correctly recognized, and showed respect for, this
principle. By declining to issue a remedial order in Robinson I,98

to judge the qualifications of its own members, it did not automatically preclude judicial
review of Congress's exercise of that authority. Clearly, the separation-of-powers principle-that one branch of government "isnot permitted to encroach on the domain of another,"
see supra note 167 and accompanying text-would mandate that the Supreme Court view
Congressman Powell's claim as a nonjusticiable political question. Otherwise, the Court would
be interfering with a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment" of authority to Congress.
On the other hand, had the Court accepted the arguments of the defendants in Powell
and ruled that Article I, Section 5, granted each house of Congress "unreviewable discretion,"
TRIBE, supra note 107, at 104, to judge the qualifications of its members, the House of
Representatives would have been left as the final judge of the constitutionality of its own
action to exclude Adam Clayton Powell from the 90th Congress. Taken to its extreme,
..unreviewable discretion" would mean unchecked authority to exclude otherwise duly elected
members of Congress, a scenario utterly inconsistent with the most fundamental notion of our
government-that "We the People" choose those who will represent us. See supra note 146.
Therefore, the Supreme Court in Powell v. McCormack had to choose between not interfering
with the House of Representatives' exercise of its Article I, Section 5, authority-the choice
mandated by strict adherence to separation of powers-or interfering with the *ability of the
House of Representatives to be the final judge of the constitutionality of its own actions-the
choice mandated by strict adherence to checks and balances. The Court either had to adhere
to separation of powers-and surrender a portion of its judicial review authority-or it had to
adhere to checks and balances-and reaffirm its role "as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution." Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 521 (1969) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 211 (1962)).
191. 351 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975).
192. Id. at 719.
193, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
194, See supra note 39.
195, Robinson I, 303 A.2d at 294.
196, Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 367 (N.J. 1990) (Abbott ).
197, 306 A.2d 65 (N.J. 1973).
198, Id. at 66.
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the court "allow[ed] the fullest scope to the exercise of the
Legislature's legitimate power,"' 99 giving the Legislature almost two
years to enact remedial legislation. Had the court ordered into effect a
detailed public school finance scheme so as to ensure that all students
received the constitutionally mandated "thorough and efficient" education, it would have been unduly encroaching upon-in fact, usurping-the Legislature's constitutional authorization to do so; it would
0
have been acting as New Jersey's unelected "super-legislature." "
Because the court's authority to craft a remedy designed to cure the
constitutional violation found in Robinson I (for which it normally
has wide discretion) would have significantly and substantially interfered with the Legislature's authority under the "thorough and efficient" clause, the New Jersey justices correctly recognized that respect
for separation of powers required that its authority to provide this
specific plaintiff with a remedy yield to the Legislature's constitutional authority and duty to provide all students with a "thorough and
efficient" education.2"'
Conversely, deference °2 to the Legislature in that situation
would not have significantly or substantially interfered with the
court's plenary authority to adjudicate cases and controversies because
deference of this type would not limit the ability of the courts to
determine when a constitutional right has been violated. 2 3 However,
199. Abbott I, 575 A.2d at 367.
200. McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 165 (Ga. 1981).
201. However, the "this specific plaintiff vs. all students" rationale loses some of its
persuasive power in the context of a class action such as Abbott v. Burke. See Abbott v.
Burke, 495 A.2d 376, 380 n.1 (N.J. 1985) (Abbott 1).
202. Initially, the court must defer because it must assume that the Legislature will
comply with the constitutional mandate and remedy the unconstitutional status quo. After all,
legislators, like judges, do take oaths to uphold the constitution. This assumption is akin to
the presumption of validity that accompanies most legislative acts. See Robinson v. Cahill,
355 A.2d 129, 132 (N.J. 1976). (Robinson V). Until it becomes clear that the assumption is
false and that the Legislature will not comply with the constitutional mandate, the court must
defer to the Legislature's "fundamental and primary" role in providing for the "maintenance
and support of a thorough and efficient system" of public education for every child in the
state. N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, para 1.
203. At this juncture, it is important to make a vital distinction between what Professor
Redish has termed "substantive deference" and what he has termed "procedural deference."
Redish, supra note 106, at 1048-49. According to Professor Redish, "substantive deference"-"in which the judiciary, while retaining power to render final decisions on the meaning of the constitutional limits, nevertheless takes into account the need for expertise or quick
action'"-is an "appropriate" form of deference that the judiciary sometimes shows to the
legislative and executive branches of govemment. Id at 1048. On the other hand, Professor
Redish views what he termed "procedural deference" as an "unacceptable" form of deference
because it involves a situation "where the court concludes simply that resort to the judiciary
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constitutes the wrong 'procedure,' because the decision is exclusively that of the political
branches." Id. at 1049 (emphasis added); see also TRIBE, supra note 107, at 97 (asserting
that "one should not accept lightly the proposition that there are provisions of the Constitution which the courts may not independently interpret, since it is plainly inconsistent with
Marbury v. Madison's basic assumption that the Constitution is judicially declarable law.").
The difference between "substantive deference" and "procedural deference" is this: while the
latter would amount to a total abdication of the court's power to conduct judicial review, the
former would not. Redish, supra note 106, at 1060. As Professor Redish points out, "the
grave potential dangers to individual liberty that would result from a total judicial abdication
make clear that the courts must exercise some meaningful review, if only to provide a floor
of constitutionally acceptable governmental behavior." IM at 1061.
A contrast between Robinson v. Cahill and RE.F.£T. v. Cuomo, 578 N.Y.S.2d 969
(Sup. Ct. 1991) will illuminate why this distinction is so vital. In Robinson I, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey concluded that the the state's then-existing system of public school
financing violated the "thorough and efficient" clause of the New Jersey Constitution. See
supra notes 38-49 and accompanying text. But in Robinson II and Robinson II, the supreme
court postponed the issuance of any remedial order so as to give the Legislature ample time
to rectify the unconstitutional status quo. See supra notes 49-55. By doing so, the court
displayed a considerable amount of substantive deference to the Legislature, at least as
Professor Redish has defined that concept. See Redish, supra note 106, at 1048-49. In effect,
the court issued a declaratory judgement in Robinson I that the public school financing
system was unconstitutional. But in Robinson II, the court, apparently realizing that the
Legislature possessed a greater institutional capacity and more expertise to create an educational system that complied with the "thorough and efficient" clause, retained jurisdiction of
the matter but postponed the issuance of any remedy for almost two years. Robinson II, 306
A.2d at 66. By retaining jurisdiction in Robinson II without issuing any remedial order then
and there, the court apparently took "into account the need for [the Legislature's] expertise"
in educational matters, but it also retained the power to issue any remedial order necessary to
vindicate the constitutional rights of New Jersey's schoolchildren-their fundamental right to a
"thorough and efficient" education. Professor Redish's definition of "appropriate" substantive
deference accurately describes the actions taken by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in
Robinson I, Robinson II, and Robinson IlI.
By contrast, the trial court in RE..I.T v. Cuomo simply dismissed the plaintiffs'
claims as being nonjusticiable. RE.F.I.T, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 976. As demonstrated earlier, this
dismissal cannot be justified on political question grounds. See supra notes 107-62 and
accompanying text. It also cannot be justified as the only course of action permitted by the
Court of Appeals' decision in Board of Educ., Levittown v. Nyquist. See supra note 106. In
fact, while the Court of Appeals did defer to the expertise of the Legislature in Levittown, it
exercised substantive deference, not procedural deference, by specifically reserving the right to
strike down any legislatively enacted educational scheme that produced "gross and glaring
inadequacy." Levittown, 57 N.Y.2d at 48. In addition, the Court of Appeals never held in
Levittown that education financing was the exclusive responsibility of the Legislature; on the
contrary, it merely held that education financing was the "[p]rimary responsibility" of the
Legislature. Md.at 49 n.9. On the other hand, the decision of the trial court in RE.F.I.T.v.
Cuomo, granting the defendants' motion to dismiss for nonjusticiability, amounted to an
exercise of "procedural" deference, the type of deference that Professor Redish has deemed
"unacceptable." Redish, supra note 106, at 1049. The "underlying philosophy," RE.F.LT, 578
N.Y.S.2d at 976, of Levittown, that the New York Legislature bore the "[p]rimary responsibility" for crafting a "fair and equitable educational" system, Levittown, 57 N.Y.2d at 49 n.9,
"at most establish[ed] a . . . need for substantive deference, not for the total abdication of
judicial authority," Redish, supra note 106, at 1051 (emphasis in original), that the trial court
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this last assertion holds true only as long as the Legislature in fact
provides the plaintiff with a remedy for the violation of his or her
constitutional right. (Of course, the New Jersey Legislature refused to
do so until well after Robinson IV was decided.) If, initially, the
court's power to "appraise [legislative] compliance with the Constitution,, ' °4 its power of judicial review, 205 is not threatened by deferring to the Legislature's authority and duty under the "thorough and
efficient" clause, that power becomes threatened if the Legislature
fails or refuses to remedy the violation of plaintiff's constitutional
right. The Legislature's failure or refusal to provide a sufficient remedy would become, in effect, a denial of the existence of the violation
of the right, or even of the right itself. After all, what good would it
do to say that one has a legal right if the law will not afford a remedy for a violation of that right?2°0 Thus, by failing or refusing to
remedy a constitutional violation, especially one of its own doing, the
Legislature completely usurped the plenary authority of the judiciary
to review the constitutionality of legislative enactments.2"
In order to prevent the Legislature's violation of the plaintiffs'
constitutional right to a "thorough and effecient" education from
persisting indefinitely, the court was forced to provide a provisional
remedy in Robinson IV. Clearly, "[tihe extraordinary action [taken by
the Robinson IV court] 208 was grounded in the undeniable principle
that when legislative inaction threatens to abridge a fundamental right
such as education, the judiciary must afford an appropriate remedy,"' even when, by providing that remedy, the court interferes

felt "compelled" to exercise in R.E.F.LT. v. Cuomo., 578 N.Y.S.2d at 976.
204. Robinson v. Cahill, 351 A.2d 713, 719 (N.J. 1975) (Robinson IV).
205. See supra note 95.
206. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (noting that "[t]he government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of
men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy
for the violation of a vested legal right.").
207. In fact, the longer the Legislature delayed in remedying the "profound" violation of
plaintiffs' constitutional right to a "thorough and efficient" education, the more it encroached
upon the judiciary's plenary authority both to determine whether a plaintiff properly before it
enjoys a constitutional right and whether a legislative enactment has abridged that constitutional right.
208. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
209. Abbott I, 495 A.2d at 382; see also J. Skelly Wright, The Role of the Supreme
Court in a Democratic Society-Judicial Activism or Restraint?, 54 CoRNELL L. REV. 1, 9
(1968). (stating that, "[i]f substantial rights are at stake which the legislative process cannot
or will not vindicate, the task of doing so unfortunately, but inevitably, passes to the
courts.").
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with "the activities of another branch of government. '210 In other
words, the supreme court had to check the Legislature's continuing
abridgement of plaintiffs' fundamental constitutional right, and thus
the ability of the Legislature to abridge the constitution itself, by
embarking on a course of events that the separation-of-powers principle counseled it not to do. Robinson IV presented the court with a
direct confrontation between separation of powers and checks and
balances, and the court wisely chose the latter.211
Judge Skelly Wright, in the course of applauding some of the
Warren Court's most controversial decisions, once wrote:
[Where the choice is between the Court struggling alone with a
social issue and the legislature dealing with it expertly, legislative
action is to be preferred. All too often, however, the practical
choice has been between the Court doing the job as best it can and
no one doing it at all. Faced with these alternatives, the Court must
assume the legislature's responsibility. If the legislature simply cannot or does not act to correct an unconstitutional status quo, the
Court, despite all its incapacities, must finally act to do so. For
"nature abhors a political vacuum as much as any other kind," and
if the legislatures do not live up to their constitutional responsibilities, the Court must act to fill the vacuum.21 2
Clearly, "[j]udicial deference can go just so far. '213 But that still
does not tell us just how far it can or should go. According to Professor Redish, "[t]he level of . . .deference will ...vary, depending
on the severity of both the asserted emergency and of the loss of
liberty involved. '214 In Robinson v. Cahill, "the loss of liberty involved"-the denial to New Jersey's schoolchildren of their fundamental right to a "thorough and efficient" education-grew more and

210. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 87 (Wash. 1978). See Robinson IV,
351 A.2d at 724 (stating that, "[t]his Court, as the designated last-resort guarantor of the
Constitution's command, possesses and must use power equal to its responsibility. Sometimes,
unavoidably incident thereto and in response to a constitutional mandate, the Court must act,
even In a sense seem to encroach, in areas otherwise reserved to other Branches of government." (citing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (emphasis added)).
211. "Mhe true principle that should guide the allocation of power [among the three
branches of government] is not the principle of separation of the three kinds of power but is
the principle of check. The danger is not blended power. The danger is unchecked power."
Robinson v. Cahill, 351 A.2d 713, 737 (N.J. 1975) (Robinson IV) (Mountain & Clifford, J3.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
212. Wright, supra note 209, at 6.
213. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 376 (N.J. 1990) (Abbott II).
214. Redish, supra note 106, at 1051.
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more substantial with every dead line that the Legislature neglected
and ignored.2" 5 This ever-increasing loss of liberty, coupled with the
severe "constitutional exigency" 2 6-the Legislature's continued failure or recalcitrant refusal to remedy the unconstitutional status
quo-finally forced the court to take affirmative remedial action in
Robinson IV. 217 Clearly, after "pausing in deference to the doctrine
of separation of powers" for over two years, 21 8 the court concluded
that "[tihe need for immediate and affirmative judicial action [to
remedy the constitutional violation was] apparent." 1 9
And yet, the justices of the New Jersey Supreme Court expressed
three strikingly different views in Robinson IV as to when it should
have abandoned its deferential attitude and acted affirmatively to
remedy the "unconstitutional status quo." 220 They had little more
than common sense to guide them. The majority of the court concluded that the then-existing state of affairs, marked by the recalcitrant
Legislature's inaction, "was sufficiently serious to justify the action"
that it finally undertook, 1 but that earlier action would not have
been justified or warranted. Justice Pashman, who concurred in part
only, concluded that, after seeking "to render every possible deference
to the primacy in this field granted to the Legislature by the Constitution," the court had "long since reached the point beyond which
continued toleration by this court of the status quo would implicate
2 Therefore, Justhe court itself in these constitutional violations. ' 22
tice Pashman would have ordered "relief both broader in scope and
calculated to implement more directly the mandates of the ['thorough
and efficient'] clause as construed by our prior decisions in this
case."2 3 At the opposite extreme, Justices Mountain and Clifford
concluded that continued strict adherence to separation of powers
would have been .the wisest course of action: "[W]e cannot at the
present time forsee a state of affairs or set of circumstances which
would justify [the majority's] encroachment upon the prerogative of

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

See supra note 207.
See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
Robinson v. Cahill, 351 A.2d 713, 717 (N.J. 1975) (Robinson V).
Id at 720.
Wright, supra note 209, at 6.
Robinson IV, 351 A.2d at 738.
Id at 725.

223.

Id
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another branch of government." 22 Obviously, there are no easy answers and it is impossible to say that any one of these three views
was wrong. Perhaps the best solution to the difficult separation-ofpowers problem inherent throughout Robinson v. Cahil'2 would
have been to avoid the problem altogether. As will be demonstrated
presently, the Supreme Court of New Jersey has attempted to do just
that, and has likely succeeded, in Abbott v. Burke.
IV.

ABBOTT V. BURKE

As this Note has thus far attempted to demonstrate, the most
difficult barrier that advocates of public school finance reform have
faced in first-generation cases6 is judicial deference 2 to educational systems enacted by state legislatures pursuant to explicit constitutional commands." s In fact, a number of state supreme courts
have upheld the constitutionality of education financing systems that
they readily acknowledged to be grossly inequitable and in need of
substantial reform. 9 Those courts have done so primarily because
of this deference to state legislatures.'
Even in cases in which
plaintiffs have successfully demonstrated the unconstitutionality of a
state's public school financing scheme, "[t]he gap between a favorable
judicial decision and a favorable remedy [has been] a wide one, " 23'
z2
as the protracted Robinson v. Cahill litigation made so clear.

224. Id, at 739.
225. See supra notes 91-94.
226. See supra note 91.
227. Throughout the remainder of this Note, and unless indicated otherwise, the term
"deference" refers to substantive deference, not procedural deference. See supra note 203.
228. Hubsch, supra note 2, at 115.
229. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 59 (1973)
(Stewart, J., concurring) (stating that Texas' system of financing public education is "chaotic
and unjust."); see also Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982);
McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1981); Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635
(Idaho 1975).
230. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 59 (stating that "the ultimate solutions must come from
[state legislatures] and from the democratic pressures of those who elect them."); see also
Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1025; McDaniel, 285 S.E.2d at 165; Thompson, 537 P.2d at 648.
231. James W. Guthrie, United States School Finance Policy 1955-1980, in SCHOOL
FINANCE POUCIES AND PRACTICEs: THE 1980s, A DECADE OF CONFLICT 38 (1980).

232. See supra notes 35-90 and accompanying text. The Robinson plaintiffs waited almost
five years before receiving a remedy for the violation of their fundamental constitutional
rights to a "thorough and efficient" education. While the trial court first declared New
Jersey's then-existing public school financing scheme unconstitutional in January, 1972, the
legislature failed to provide fully funded remedial legislation until the 1976-77 school year.
See Robinson v. Cahill, 287 A.2d 187 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972) (subsequent history
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Therefore, the inevitable question has become: what can courts do in
public school finance reform litigation to avoid the problem caused
by judicial deference, and to ensure that plaintiffs promptly receive an
adequate remedy for a violation of their constitutional rights, while
still adhering to and respecting the separation-of-powers limitationsP33 upon their remedial power in the context of education? The
remainder of this Note will examine how the Supreme Court of New
Jersey answered this question in Abbott v. Burke.
A.

ProceduralHistory

In 1981, a number of schoolchildren from Camden, East Orange,
Jersey City, and Irvington, four of New Jersey's poorest districts, 2 4
brought an action in Superior Court, alleging that the Public School
Education Act of 1975'-5 violated the "thorough and efficient"
itt2ha
had been applied. 3 7 In Abbott v. Burke (Abbott
clause?" as 236
1),238 the Supreme Court of New Jersey ruled that plaintiffs' action
should be considered initially by the appropriate state administrative
agency (the Department of Education) rather than by a trial court. 39

omitted); see also supra notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 167-225 and accompanying text.
234. Mary Jane Connelly and Jack McGee, School Finance Litigation of the 1980's, 12
J. EDUC. FIN. 578, 584 (1987).
235. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:7A-1 to -52 (West 1989).
236. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
237. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 363 (N.J. 1990) (Abbott II). As noted earlier, the
supreme court found the 1975 Act constitutional on its face in Robinson V, 355 A.2d 129
(NJ. 1976). But substantial doubts, expressed by three members of the court in Robinson V,
that the 1975 Act would satisfy the constitutional mandate of the "thorough and efficient"
clause as applied practically ensured an as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of the
1975 Act. See Robinson V, 355 A.2d at 139 (Hughes, C.J., concurring); 355 A.2d at 143
(Conford, P.J.A.D., tla, dissenting in part); 355 A.2d at 163 (Pashman, J., dissenting).
238. 495 A.2d 376 (N.J. 1985).
239. Under N.J. STAT. ANN. section 18A:6-9, the state's Commissioner of Education has
"plenary authority 'to hear and determine all controversies and disputes arising under the
school laws . . . ." Abbott I, 495 A.2d at 393 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-9 (West
1989)). According to the Abbott I court, "the school laws include the Public School Education Act of 1975, and . .,. a controversy now awaits resolution." l The court ruled that
this action should initially be considered by the Department of Education ("DOE") rather than
by a superior court judge for two primary reasons: (1) the DOE has "the particular training,
acquired expertise, actual experience, and direct regulatory responsibility" in education matters;
and (2) administrative hearings would serve to develop a far more fully informed factual
record "than could be developed in Superior Court." Id at 392. According to one commentator
Abbott I in 1985 reflected substantial deference to both the legislative and
executive branches. In remanding the matter to the commissioner of education, the
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While the state Commissioner of Education normally presides over
the hearing of controversies that involve the "school laws,"' ° the
supreme court in Abbott I ruled that, because the Commissioner was
the primary-named defendant, he had to transfer the initial hearing of
the case to an impartial administrative law judge ("AU").2
Almost one hundred days of hearings before the ALl resulted in
an enormous and elaborate factual record. 2 Because the Abbott
plaintiffs were students living and attending school in four poor urban
districts, their factual presentations to the ALU focused almost exclu243
sively upon the wretched state of education in those districts.
Their factual presentations also focused upon the extreme disparities
between the educational opportunities available to students in more
affluent suburban districts and the opportunities available to students
in the poor urban districts. 2' After considering the evidence presented, "the ALJ found that evidence of substantial disparities in
educational inputs (such as course offerings, teacher staffing, and perpupil expenditures) were related to disparities in school district
wealth."245 Therefore, the ALJ concluded "that the plaintiffs' districts, and others, were not providing [their students with] the constitutionally mandated thorough and efficient education; that the inequality of educational opportunity statewide itself constituted a denial of a
thorough and efficient education; that the failure was systemic; and

Court gave both the Legislature and the executive time to respond to the obvious

inequities in the application of the [legislation] the Court had approved on its face
in [Robinson V].
Neither the Legislature nor the executive took advantage of this opportunity,
but rather they opted to defend the current system ....
Robert F. Williams, With Abbott, Justices in for the Long Haul, 125 N.L L.J. 1664 (1990).
Clearly, the "deference" about which Professor Williams wrote is yet another example of the
substantive deference that the supreme court showed to the Legislature and the Executive
throughout much of Robinson v. Cahill. See supra note 203. In fact, still another example of
the supreme court's substantive deference to the Legislature is its holding in Robinson V that
the 1975 Act was facially constitutional despite the considerable doubts expressed by three
members of the court, see supra note 237, that the Act would prove to be constitutional as
applied. Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 367. Specifically, the Robinson V court found the 1975 Act
facially constitutional "in deference to the Legislature's clear responsibility, the newness of
the statutory response, and the lack of experience under it . . . ." Id at 371.
240. Abbott 1, 495 A.2d at 393 (quoting NJ. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-9 (West 1989).
241. Abbott I, 495 A.2d at 393.
242. Paul L. Tractenberg, A Constitutional Commitment to Education, 125 NJ. L. 1664
(1990).
243. Id.

244. Id.
245. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 364 (NJ. 1990) (Abbott I).
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that the [1975 Act] and its funding were unconstitutional."246
The state's Commissioner of Education, the primary defendant in
this action, completely rejected the ALJ's factual findings, legal conclusions, and recommendations as to the type of funding scheme that
would achieve "substantial equality of educational opportunity
throughout the state. "247 He concluded that "the Act guaranteed a
thorough and efficient education by virtue of the school districts'
[theoretically] unlimited power to raise funds to satisfy their constitutional obligation, the Commissioner's power to require them to do so,
and the Commissioner's power to take over248 the operation of any
district that [was] fail[ing]." 249 Furthermore, he concluded that any
failure to provide students with a thorough and efficient education
"was district-specific and remediable under the existing funding sys" 250

tem.

The state Board of Education reviewed the Commissioner's factual and legal conclusions and agreed with them "in almost all respects."'" Ultimately, the Board of Education concluded that "the
Act as implemented was constitutional as applied throughout the entire state."1 2 Plaintiffs appealed the Board's decision directly to the
Supreme Court of New Jersey, which certified the appeal directly,
bypassing the Appellate Division. 3
B.

The Supreme Court's Evolving Interpretation
of the Thorough and Efficient Clause

In Robinson I,' the supreme court, for the first time,' 5 defined the amount and type of education that New Jersey's students
were entitled to under the explicit mandate of the constitution's
"thorough and efficient" clause. As noted earlier, the Robinson I court
concluded that the "thorough and efficient" clause requires the State
and
to provide all students with "equal educational opportunity,"

246. IM
247. Id. at 364-65.
248. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:7A-14 to -16 (West 1989).
249.

Abbott II,575 A.2d at 365.

250. Id.
251. Id
252. Id
253.
254.

Id at 359.
303 A.2d 273 (1973).

255. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
256. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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that the constitutional command of equal educational opportunity
requires the State to provide each and every child with "that educational opportunity which is needed in the contemporary setting to
equip a child for his role as a citizen and as a competitor in the
labor market." ' However, in Robinson I, the supreme court explicitly held that the constitutional command does not require state-wide
equality of educational expenditures;"5 it permits per-pupil funding
disparities among districts, but only as long as those disparities do
"not become a device for diluting the State's mandated responsibility"
to provide all students with equal educational opportunity. 9 Ultimately, the Robinson I court concluded that the Legislature had not
satisfied its constitutional duty to provide all students with a "thorough and efficient" education solely on the basis of gross disparities
in per-pupil expenditures among property-wealthy and property-poor
districts, because it had "been shown no other viable criterion for
measuring compliance with the constitutional mandate." 26° Thus, the
Robinson I court clearly implied that its decision to examine the
constitutional mandate of the "thorough and efficient" clause solely in
terms of educational funding disparities was essentially a stopgap, a
viable method of measuring the State's compliance with the constitutional mandate only until the State substantively defined the content
of a "thorough and efficient" education. 61
In sections 4 and 5 of the Public School Education Act of 1975,
the Legislature finally provided a comprehensive substantive definition
of the level of education mandated by the "thorough and efficient"
clause.2 62 Additionally, in Robinson V263 the supreme court confirmed what it had implied in Robinson I: the "thorough and efficient" mandate was "a requirement of a specific substantive level of
education,"2 " the level of education that would give each child an
equal opportunity to compete in the labor market and to fulfill his or
her role as a citizen.265 The court unequivocally concluded that per-

257. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
258. Robinson 1, 303 A.2d at 294.
259. IM at 298.
260. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
261. Robinson I, 303 A.2d at 295; see also Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 369 (N.J.
1990) (Abbott I).
262. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:7A-4 and 18A:7A-5 (West 1989).
263. 355 A.2d 129 (NJ. 1976).
264. Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 368.
265. Robinson I, 303 A.2d at 295. Specifically, the Robinson V court found that "each
pupil shall be offered an equal opportunity to receive an education of such excellence as will
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pupil expenditure disparities-the sole basis for its holding in Robinson I that the "thorough and efficient" mandate was not being
met?6-were relevant only if those disparities impacted upon the
substantive level of educational offering.2 67 Therefore, even though
the funding mechanism of the 1975 Act was virtually certain to produce substantial per-pupil funding disparities between property-wealthy
and property-poor districts, 2 the Robinson V court found that the
1975 Act, examined as a whole,269 was facially constitutional."7
As Chief Justice Wilentz noted, "[tihe change of focus from the
dollar disparity in Robinson I to substantive educational content in
Robinson V is clear; it was the main theme underlying the court's
[in Robinson V] that the Act was [facially] constitutiondetermination
1
27

al."1

In Abbott I, in which the supreme court decided that the original
hearing of the controversy should be conducted by an administrative
law judge and not by a trial court judge,272 the court modified and
clarified its interpretation of the "thorough and efficient" clause in
two fundamental ways. First, the Abbott I court effectively abandoned
the Robinson V court's focus upon an absolute minimum substantive
level of educational offering, in favor of a new concept of comparative equal educational opportunity. Abbott I's clarification as to what
types of proofs were relevant to "the thorough and efficient education
issues" meant that, if a comparison of those educational opportunities
received by poorer disadvantaged students and those received by
relatively advantaged students made it clear that the former would not
be able to compete in, and contribute to, the society entered by the

meet the constitutional standard." Robinson V, 355 A.2d at 134. This explanation of equal
educational oppportunity focuses exclusively upon the inputs, and not the outputs, of education. In other words, according to the Robinson V court, if a student is given an equal
opportunity to receive a thorough and efficient education, the constitutional mandate is
satisfied. The Abbott court substantially modified this view of the -thorough and efficient"
clause, one focused exclusively upon the inputs, and concluded that, while measuring the
educational inputs like breadth of curriculum, quality of teaching staff, and condition of facilities was important, it was equally important, if not more so, to measure educational outputs-the quality of education received by, not merely offered to, the students. See Abbott I,
495 A.2d at 384.
266. Abbott I, 495 A.2d at 384.
267. Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 370.
268. Id at 369.
269. Robinson V, 355 A.2d at 136.
270. Id. at 139.
271. Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 369.
272. See supra notes 239-40 and accompanying text.
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latter, those poorer disadvantaged students have been denied a "thorough and efficient" education, because they have been denied equal
educational opportunity,273 In the process, the Abbott I court substantially modified the definition of equal educational opportunity
provided by the Robinson V court, which had found that "each pupil
shall be offered an equal opportunity to receive an education of such
excellence as will meet the constitutional standard." 274 While the
Robinson V definition of equal educational opportunity focused exclusively upon educational "inputs," the revised Abbott I definition shifted the focus
of the analysis to include both educational "inputs" and
"outputs." 5 Second, the supreme court added a new "gloss" to the
constitutional mandate in Abbott I, "that the State not only had the
power to spend" more on the education of poorer disadvantaged students than on the education of relatively advantaged students in light
of the poorer students' greater needs, "but that it might be required
2 76

to do so."

Finally, in Abbott II, in which the supreme court ruled that the
1975 Act violated the "thorough and efficient" clause as it had been
applied to the the State's poorer urban districts,2' the court synthesized the major aspects of its previous interpretations of the constitutional mandate. The court combined Robinson I's concept of equal
educational opportunity, 7 8 and Robinson V's focus upon substantive
educational offering 7 9 with Abbott I's "new element" 2 ° of comparative equal educational opportunity281 and, in the process, clarified its interpretation of the "thorough and efficient" clause. Specifically, the Abbott II court concluded "that the requirement of a thorough and efficient education ... mean[s] that poorer disadvantaged

students must be given a chance to be able to compete with relatively
advantaged students."282
The importance of the supreme court's synthesis in Abbott II of
its previous interpretations of the "thorough and efficient" clause

273, Abbott v. Burke, 495 A.2d at 376, 390 (N.J. 1985) (Abbott I).
274. Robinson V, 355 A.2d at 134; see also supra note 266.
275. See supra note 265.
276. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 371 (N.J. 1990) (Abbott I) (citations omitted)
(emphasis in original).
277, Id at 363.
278. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 263-64 and accompanying text.
280. Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 372.
281. See supra notes 272-73 and accompanying text.
282. Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 372.
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cannot be overstated; that synthesis provides the structure of analysis
for the entire opinion. Not ony do all of the the court's factual analyses flow from its synthesis of the previous interpretations of the
"thorough and efficient" clause, but so does the the remedy that the
court provided for the Abbott plaintiffs." 3 Ultimately, this synthesis
is an essential element in the reaffirmation of New Jersey's constitutional commitment to the original conception of equal educational
2 84
opportunity.
C. The Funding Scheme of the 1975 Act
1. The Guaranteed Tax Base Funding Scheme
The funding scheme of the 1975 Act provides school districts
with several different types of state aid. Equalization aid is the most
important type, and it accounts for the largest portion of funds that
the state distributes to local districts.285 According to the supreme
court, "equalization aid attempts to obliterate the enormous disparity
between rich and poor for school tax purposes., 28 6 The 1975 Act's
funding scheme attempts to equalize the taxing power of school districts-that is, the ability of a poor school district to raise as much
school funding as a relatively wealthy district when both impose the
same local property tax rate-but it does so only to a limited extent.28 7 Specifically, the funding formula empowers all school districts to raise tax dollars as if their tax bases, in terms of per-pupil
property value, were 134% as large as the state's average tax
base.288 This hypothetical tax base is referred to as the guaranteed
tax base or GTB. 28 9 Each year, any given school district chooses its
tax rate as if the total value of that district's real property were equal
to the GTB.29 In other words, the Act ensures each district that,

283. See id. at 367 (concluding that "[i]n
order to pass on plaintiffs' contentions, we
must once again, in the context of this case, define the scope and content of the constitutional provision. That definition is critical to our determination of a remedy.") (emphasis
added).
284. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
285. For example, during the 1984-85 school year, equalization aid totaled $1.24 billion,
Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 378, while the next largest amount of aid was $315 million in
categorical aid. IM at 380.
286. Id. at 378.
287. Id& at 377. For a description of a funding scheme that provides for complete equalization of taxing power, see CooNs, supra note 1, at 200-09.
288. Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 377.
289. Id at 378.
290. Id
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regardless of its relative poverty, it will be able to collect an amount
of revenue as if it were levying its tax upon the GTB. Ultimately, the
local revenues that the district actually collects from the tax rate it
imposes upon its actual tax base are supplemented by equalization aid
from the state "in an amount that, when added to these local revenues, equals what the tax rate would have produced [had it been] apIn effect, the smaller a district's tax
plied to the GTB."29'
base-that is, the lower its per-pupil property value-the more state
equalization aid it will receive. Furthermore, those districts with tax
bases larger than the GTB receive no equalization aid.2"
In effect, the GTB funding scheme reduces enormous property
wealth disparities between richer and poorer districts for school funding purposes. Because the scheme guarantees poorer districts-those
districts whose actual tax bases are smaller than the GTB-the ability
to raise revenue for school funding as if their tax bases were equal to
the GTB, it creates two classes of districts for school funding purposes: those districts with a tax base "equal" to the GTB and those
districts with a tax base greater than the GTB.293 For the 1984-85
school year, the GTB amounted to $223,100-that is, 1.34 times the
state's average tax base of $186,000 per pupil-and the property
wealth distribution of those districts with tax bases greater than the
GTB ran from $223,667 per pupil to $7.8 million per pupil.2" For
the same 1984-85 school year, approximately two-thirds of the state's
districts had tax bases equal to the GTB for school tax purposes and
approximately one-third had tax bases greater than the GTB.295
Without the GTB equalizing scheme in operation, the state's per-pupil
tax bases would have ranged from a low of $22,322 to a high of
$7.8 million.296 In other words, during the 1984-85 school year, the
wealthiest district in the state had 350 times as much taxable property
wealth per pupil as the state's poorest district. Therefore, if the poorest district had not been equalized up to the GTB, and if both the
wealthiest and poorest districts taxed their property at the same rate,
the wealthiest district would have raised 350 times as much revenue

291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
declared
districts.
296.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 378.
Id.
Id. Before the 1975 Act took effect, equalization aid under the funding scheme
unconstitutional in Robinson I only equalized approximately 30% of the state's
Id. at 378.
Id. at 378.
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for school funding as the poorest district.
One interesting aspect of the GTB funding scheme is that, unlike
the foundation plan discussed earlier, 297 the GTB scheme does not
require districts to tax at any minimum rate in order to be eligible for
equalization aid. What tax rate the district taxes at, and, subsequently,
the total amount of school funding it has, are strictly for the district
to decide.2 98 Theoretically, the state is indifferent as to whether a
district spends $2,000 per pupil or $20,000 per pupil, as long as the
district manages to provide its students with the constitutionally mandated "thorough and efficient" education.299
The 1975 Act contains two important limitations upon the
equalizing impact of the 'GTB funding scheme." ° First, "the amount
of equalization aid a district receives in a budget year is based not on
its budget for that year, the current year, but on the budget of the
prior year."30 ' This limitation can have a severely negative impact
upon the equalizing effect of the GTB funding scheme.3" Second,
the Act contains a budget cap provision that restricts the amount by
which a school district may increase its budget.30 3 This provision
does not have a severe negative impact upon the equalizing effect of
the GTB scheme because poorer districts are permitted greater increases, at least percentage-wise, than richer districts. 3"

297. See supra note 13.
298. Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 378.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 378.
301. Id.
302. I1&at 379. For instance, assume that a hypothetical district, District A, had a total
school budget last year of $5 million, of which the state provided $2.5 million in equalization aid. These budget figures reveal that the state provides 50% of District A's budget;
therefore, District A's actual, unequalized tax base is exactly one-half of the GTB. This year,
District A wishes to increase its total school budget by 10% to $5.5 million. Had the state
based its award of equalization aid to districts upon current-year budget figures instead of
prior-year budget figures, District A would have had to raise only $250,000 locally in order

to increase its total budget by $500,000 because the state would pay for 50% of the increase.
But under the existing system of awarding equalization aid based upon prior-year budget
figures, District A would have to raise the entire $500,000 increase from local sources, with
no state equalization assistance. This system would discourage a poor district with an already
high tax rate from making such annual increases in its school budget because it would have
to bear the entire burden. Therefore, "[b]oth the Commissioner and the Board [of Education],
in their decisions in this case, support[ed] legislative change to a current year funding system." Id.
303. Id.
304. Id at 379.
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2. Minimum Support Aid
The funding scheme of the 1975 Act provides minimum aid for
those districts with a property valuation that exceeds the GTB; 0 s
only those districts that receive no equalization aid receive minimum
aid. 3" Because minimum support aid is given only to richer districts, it is entirely anti-equalizing. 3" In other words, this type of
aid actually increases the already large disparities in per-pupil expenditures between richer and poorer districts.3"° While the amount of
minimum support aid is not as substantial as it was prior to the enactment of the 1975 Act, it still amounted to $163 million during the
1989-1990 school year-all of which went to wealthier districts."
Even worse is the fact that the minimum aid provision of the 1970
Act, declared unconstitutional in Robinson I, was merely non-equalizing-that is, it neither increased nor decreased funding disparities
between richer and poorer districts because all districts received the
same per-pupil amount of minimum aid.31 The minimum aid provision of the 1975 Act, on the other hand, is a blatant subsidy for the
wealthy.' It is, in effect, a reward for being rich. 2 Why is minimum support aid given to "'rich' districts when a substantial number
of 'poor' districts are underfinanced?"3 3 In fact, "[w]hy are any

305. Id.
306. Id. According to the supreme court, "[i]n 1985-86, 34.4% of New Jersey's school
districts, or 207 districts, were above the guaranteed tax base and received minimum aid." Id.
at 379 n.12.
307. I1& at 379. Another anti-equalizing type of state aid given under the 1975 Act is
Teachers' Pension Annuity Fund (TPAF) aid. It at 380. TPAF aid is invidiously anti-equalizing because "the richer districts tend to have more and better paid teachers per pupil than the
poorer districts." Id. In fact, TPAF aid is what Coons, Clune, and Sugarman have termed an
anti-equalizing "revenue task unit" because, generally, the wealthier a district is, the more
TPAF funding it will receive. COONS, supra note 1, at 74-75. Even though TPAF funding is
a substantial portion of the state's education budget-for instance, it amounted to $535.8
million in 1984-85-the Abbott court refused to disturb its distribution for practical reasons.
Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 380.
308. Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 380; see also id. at 406 (concluding that the sole function of
minimum aid "is to enable richer districts to spend even more, thereby increasing the disparity of educational funding between richer and poorer" districts).
309. Id at 379-80.
310. See supra note 64.
311. For instance, during the 1984-85 school year, Englewood Cliffs, a district with a
per-pupil property valuation of $1.24 million, received $135 per pupil in minimum aid. Also,
Saddle River Borough, a district with a per-pupil property valuation of $1.23 million, received
$177 per pupil in minimum aid during the same school year. Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 407.
312. COONS, supra note 1, at 124.
313. Robinson v. Cahill, 355 A.2d 129, 153 (N.J. 1976) (Robinson V) (Conford, PJ.A.D.,
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dollars given to rich districts when the poor districts are not yet
equalized? The answer must lie in expedience, as it surely does not
lie in fairness."3'14 Accordingly, in Abbott I, the supreme court held
the minimum support aid provision of the 1975 Act unconstitutional
because it increased funding disparities between richer and poorer
districts, and because it "ha[d] no arguable educational or administrative justification."3 15
D.

EducationalFunding Disparities Under the 1975 Act

The Abbott plaintiffs attempted to prove that the funding scheme
of the 1975 Act worsened the per-pupil expenditure disparities between wealthier and poorer districts, compared with the disparities
that existed prior to the enactment of the 1975 Act.3" 6 The supreme
court concluded that they had successfully done so, and proceeded to
analyze and catalog those disparities.3 7 After analyzing those dis-

t/a, dissenting in part).
314. COONS, supra note 1, at 125 (emphasis added).
315. Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 407.
316. Id at 382.
317. Id A brief summary of the court's descriptions of these funding disparities would
illuminate their importance in the court's ultimate conclusion that the 1975 Act was unconstitutional as applied to the state's poorer urban districts. See supra note 16.
The plaintiffs' expert catalogued the state's districts in terms of their per-pupil expenditure level for each year from 1975-76 through 1984-85. Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 382-83.
According to her analysis, in 1975-76, the year before the 1975 Act took effect, those
districts at the ninety-fifth percentile (again, solely in terms of per-pupil expenditure level)
spent $1,974 per pupil while those districts at the fifth percentile spent $1,076-a difference
of $898 per pupil. Id Subsequently, in 1984-85, districts at the ninety-fifth percentile spent
$4,755 per pupil while districts at the fifth percentile spent only $2,687-a difference of
$2,068 per pupil. Id Even when adjusted for inflation in terms of 1975 dollars, the expenditure disparity increase is still significant: it grew from $898 per pupil in 1975-76 to $1,135
per pupil in 1984-85. Id The plaintiff's expert measured the impact of this disparity by
comparing large groups of wealthier and poorer districts. For instance, during the 1984-85
school year, a group of wealthier districts educating approximately 190,000 students spent
40% more per pupil than a group of poorer districts educating approximately 355,000. lit In
terms of per-pupil expenditures, these wealthier districts spent $4,029, while the poorer
districts spent only $2,861. Id
The plaintiffs' expert also catalogued the state's districts' per-pupil expenditure levels
in terms of septiles or sevenths, with Septile 7 including those districts with the highest perpupil expenditure levels and Septile 1 including those districts with the lowest per-pupil
expenditure levels. Id at 387. Each septile in this analysis contained about one-seventh of the
state's students. Id at 387. For the 1984-85 school year, per-pupil expenditure levels ranged
from a low of $932 to $2,634 in Septile 1, but in Septile 7 the per-pupil expenditure levels
ranged from a low of $4,055 to a high of $10,103. Id. at 388. Therefore, none of the
lowest-spending districts in Septile 1 spent more than $2,634 per pupil, while none of the
highest-spending districts in Septile 7 spent less than $4,055 per pupil. Coupled with these

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1991

51

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 6
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:429

parities, the court concluded that they generally showed that "the
poorer the district-measured by [property] valuation per pupil, or by
other indicators of poverty-the less the per-pupil expenditure; the
poorer and more urban the district, the heavier its [local property tax
rate], the greater the school tax burden ... .",' Finally, the court
discussed the multiple relevancies of these statistical disparities, generally showing that the poorest districts had the least amount of
school funding available and that the wealthiest districts had the
greatest amount of school funding available.

Mo the extent educational quality is deemed related to dollar expenditures, it tends to prove inadequate quality of education in the
poorer districts, unless we were to assume that the substantial differential in expenditures is attributable to an education in the richer
districts far beyond anything that thorough and efficient demands; it
indicates even more strongly the probability that the poorer districts'
students will be unable to compete in the society entered by the
richer districts' students; and by its consistency over the years, it

that the system as it now operates is unable to correct
suggests
9
this.31

statistics was the fact that the average property wealth of Septile 1 districts was $88,907 per
pupil, while the average property wealth of Septile 7 districts was $360,359-a differential of
more than 4 to 1. Id.
Finally, New Jersey's Department of Education, at the request of the supreme court,
analyzed these same relationships between per-pupil expenditure level and per-pupil property
wealth by cataloguing the state's school districts according to their socioeconomic status
("SES"). The Department of Education ranked the state's districts in District Factor Groups or
DFGs, with the districts in DFGs A and B having the lowest SES rankings and the districts
in DFGs I and J having the highest SES rankings. Id. at 384-85. According to the supreme
court, its analysis, in which it compared the relationship between per-pupil expenditure level
and per-pupil property wealth for DFGs A and B versus DFGs I and J, "produce[d] substantially the same results" as the septile analysis. Id. at 388. For example, during 1984-85, the
districts in DFGs A and B had an average per-pupil expenditure level of $2,861, while the
districts in DFGs I and J had an average per-pupil expenditure level of $4,029. As for the
comparison in terms of property wealth, during the same 1984-85 school year, the districts in
DFGs A and B had an average per-pupil property valuation of $94,998, while the districts in
DFGs I and J had an average per-pupil property valuation of $302,593. d. According to the
court, "[n]o sophisticated [statistical] analysis can destroy the conclusion: the richer districts
spend more than the poorer, and their ability to do so is strongly correlated to wealth." Id.
at 388.
318. Abbott H, 575 A.2d at 384.
319. Id. at 384 (emphasis added); see also id at 407 (finding that per-pupil funding
disparities between richer and poorer districts "strongly [support] and [are] . . . necessary
element[s] of our conclusion that the education provided these students from poorer urban
districts will not enable them to compete with their suburban colleagues or to function effectively as citizens in the same society.").
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Thus, the Abbott court clearly viewed educational funding disparities
between richer and poorer districts as highly relevant to the resolution
of the ultimate issue before it: whether the 1975 Act afforded to
students in poorer districts an education that would enable them to
compete in, and contribute to, the society entered by their relatively
advantaged peers from richer districts. If the Act did not afford students in poorer districts such an education, it violated the "thorough
and efficient" clause by denying them equal educational opportunity.
E. The Substantive Comparison of Education Offered to Students in
Affluent Suburban Districts and Poorer Urban Districts
The "primary basis"32 of the supreme court's decision in
Abbott v. Burke was its comparative demonstration that the quality of
education provided to students in poorer urban districts is grossly
inferior to the quality of education provided to students in affluent
suburban districts.32' By contrasting the educational opportunities

320. Id. at 394.
321. These terms-"poorer urban" and "affluent suburban"-have specific, concrete
connotations, especially in the context of this case.. Based upon data prepared and provided
by the plaintiffs, as well as the state Department of Education ("DOE"), the Abbott court
crafted these two categories of school districts, categories that flowed directly from the
court's synthesized interpretation of the "thorough and efficient" clause and effectively determined both the form and content of its opinion. See supra notes 277-82 and accompanying
text.
The court began its categorization of school districts by discussing the importance and
significance of socioeconomic status ("SES") in the factual analysis. SES is a numerical measurement consisting of seven factors-per-capita income level, occupation level, education
level, percent of residents below the poverty line, population density, urbanization (percent of
district considered urban), and unemployment level-that quantifies how a district's "social
and economic backround and environment" create advantages or disadvantages for the educational opportunity of its students. Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 384-85. Years earlier, the DOE had
divided all the school districts into ten groups, what it termed District Factor Groups or
DFGs, with each DFG containing about fifty districts. lt The DFGs were then updated and
ranked according to SES from lowest to highest, with DFG A consisting of those districts
that had the lowest SES, and DFG J consisting of those districts that had the highest SES.
Iai As the court pointed out in Abbott, "a student's SES is considered by many to be the
most important factor in predicting test scores and other measures of performance." Id. at
385.
Next, the court discussed the origin and meaning of the term "urban district." Id at
386. The DOE compiled this category based upon those communities labeled "urban aid
districts" by the state Department of Community Affairs. Id Urban aid districts are those
that, because of their extreme poverty and need, qualify for substantial amounts of state
aid-as measured by factors such as size or density of municipality, number of children in
families on welfare, existence of public housing, as well as low property values and/or high
tax rates. Id. at 386. According to the court, -[t]hese 'urban districts' are the poorest and

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1991

53

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 6
HOFS7RA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 20:429

available to students in richer suburban districts with those available
to students in poorer urban districts, the supreme court demonstrated
the dramatic and severe disparities between those opportunities. The
court compared several specific educational opportunities available to
students in richer suburban districts with the grossly inferior opportunities available to students in poorer urban districts: "exposure to
"science education; "323 "foreign language procomputers; ' "
3
24
"[m]usic programs; ' '32 "[a]rt programs;" 32 "[p]hysical
grams;
education programs;" 327 the unsafe, crumbling school facilities in
poorer urban districts; 328 the lack of any advanced academic courses
in the curricula of the poorer urban districts, 329 coupled with those
districts' burden of teaching basic skills to an overwhelming number
of students. 331 In addition, the court examined other factors, such as
teacher-to-student ratios, the average experience of the teaching staff,
as well as the staff's average level of education.331
To "[complete] the picture ' 332 as to just how great the educational needs of these students in poorer urban districts are, the Abbott

most needy municipalities in the state." Id.
Finally, the court combined these two groups, low-SES DFGs (A and B) and "urban
aid districts," and discerned their common members. Those districts in DFG A or B that
qualified as urban aid districts were then grouped by the court into an entirely new category-"poorer urban districts." Id. at 386. According to the court, "[t]hese twenty-nine poorer
urban districts are not only in the lowest SES classifications (DFGs A and B), but even their

ranking within DFGs A and B is among the lowest." Id at 387 (emphasis in original).
Furthermore, "the overwhelming majority of students in districts with the lowest "SES ranking
in the state are from poorer urban districts" and "the overwhelming proportion of all minori-

ties in the state are educated in these poorer urban districts." Id.
Conversely, while the poorer urban districts are generally those with the highest

poverty indicators and the lowest SES in the state, the "richer suburban districts"-also
known as the "affluent suburban districts"-are those suburban school districts "whose indicators of wealth-per-capita income, property values, and [SES]-are the highest" in the state.
Id. at 382. Clearly, the court's categorization of the districts in this manner flows directly
from its interpretation of the "thorough and efficient" clause in both Abbott I and Abbott H.
See supra notes 272-82 and accompanying text.
322. Abbott 11, 575 A.2d at 395.
323. Id. at 395.
324. 14 at 396.
325. Id
326, Id.
327. Id at 396.
328. Id at 397.
329. Id at 398.
330. Id at 396-97.
331. Id at 399.
332. Id. at 400.
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court revealed the "shocking contrast"333 between the invariable failure of these students when taking the state's High School Proficiency
Test (HSPT)-which merely measures the students' minimum basic
skills-and the invariably high scores of over 90% achieved by students in richer suburban districts. 3" Furthermore, it discussed a severe problem seemingly unique to these poorer urban districts-the
inordinately high dropout rate.335- As the court sardonically notes,
"[a] district
cannot deliver a thorough and efficient education to a
336
dropout."
In every measurable and discemable way, the evidence of these
severe deficiencies in the quality of education provided to students in
poorer urban districts, 337 as well as the inability of the present system to address their special needs, 33' demonstrates beyond any
doubt that these students have not been receiving the constitutionally
mandated "thorough and efficient" education that would "enable all
students to function as citizens and workers in the same society." The
court's factual analysis, both of the funding disparities between richer
and poorer districts and of the shockingly deficient substantive education provided to students in poorer urban districts, makes it clear that
these students cannot "compete with their suburban colleagues or...
339
function effectively as citizens in the same society.
F.

The Abbott Holding

In his opinion for the court, Chief Justice Wilentz revealed the
court's holding at the very beginning.' He left no doubt about the
court's unanimous conclusions, because the evidence presented left no
doubt. Specifically, the court found "that under the present system the
evidence compels but one conclusion: the poorer the district and the
greater its need, the less the money available, and the worse the
education. That system is neither thorough nor efficient. We hold the

333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
districts]
educated
340.

Id
Id
Id at 401.
Id
Id at 399-400.
Id. at 402.
Id. at 407; see also id at 400 (concluding that "these students from [poorer urban
simply cannot possibly enter the same market or the same society as their peers
in wealthier districts.").
Id at 363.
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Act unconstitutional as applied to poorer urban school districts." 3"
By so holding, the Supreme Court of New Jersey became the first
court in the nation to hold a public school system unconstitutional
only as it had been applied to a fraction of the state's districts, rather
than as applied to all districts. 42 In every previous school finance
case-including Robinson v. Cahill-courts had either upheld the
constitutionality of an entire financing system despite their ac34 or had
knowledgement of substantial per-pupil funding disparities,
34
disparities.
those
on
struck down an entire system based
The Abbott court's innovative holding that the 1975 Act violated
the "thorough and efficient" clause only as applied to the state's
twenty-eight poorer urban school districts3" should profoundly influence the second generation of public school finance reform litigation
in a number of fundamental respects. First, courts will no longer have
to tolerate the existence of substantial per-pupil funding disparities
and uphold the entire financing scheme because of their separation-ofpowers instinct to defer to the legislature's "fundamental and primary"
role in educational matters, nor should they.3" In other words,
courts no longer need be so constrained in their options as to how
they should examine the constitutionality of public school financing
systems. They should carefully consider the option of holding a public school financing system-especially one laden with serious and
severe inequities-unconstitutional only as it had been applied to
some of the state's districts, if the evidence presented would support
such a holding, as it so clearly did in Abbott v. Burke. Second, the
as-applied holding may reduce the evidentiary burden upon plaintiffs
attempting to prove that a state's current public school financing
scheme violates its constitution. Instead of having to provide convincing proof of both substantive educational and funding disparities for
most or all of a state's districts, plaintiffs can narrow the focus of
their proof and focus only upon the most severe disparities and the
most needy districts. Furthermore, the as-applied holding of Abbott

341. Id.
342. See Tractenberg, supra note 242, at 1664.
343. See id.; see also supra notes 229-30 and accompanying text.
344. Tractenberg, supra note 242, at 1664.
345. By holding the 1975 Act unconstitutional only as it applied to 28 districts, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey conversely upheld the constitutionality of the Act as it applied
to the overwhelming majoity-95%-of school districts. Richard Lehne, The Unanswered
Question: Who Pays for Abbott?, 125 N.J. LJ. 1665 (1990).
346. Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 367.
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reduces the likelihood that the Supreme Court of New Jersey will
face another separation-of-powers confrontation with the Legislature,
as it did in Robinson v. Cahill, because the limited scope of its hold347
ing
necessarily limits the scope of the remedy that it has ordered. 3 8 The as-applied holding represents one unique aspect of the
supreme court's opinion; the court's remedy in Abbott-which flowed
directly from its interpretation of the "thorough and efficient" clause,
from its detailed factual analyses, and from its as-applied holding-represents another. 9
G. The Abbott Remedy: Distrusting Democracy and Guaranteeing
Virtual Representation to New Jersey's
Poorer Urban School Districts
In his book Democracy and Distrust, Professor John Hart Ely
spells out his theory of how courts should interpret the United States
Constitution. 5 Professor Ely concludes that "[i]n a representative
democracy value determinations are to be made by our elected representatives, and if in fact most of us disapprove, we can vote them
35 2
out of office." 3 1 Consequently, courts, the most "undemocratic"
branch of government, should not make value determinations, precisely because they are not directly accountable to the political processes.
However, "judicial intervention becomes appropriate when the existing
processes of representation seem inadequately fitted to the representation of minority interests, even minority interests that are not voteless." 35 3 Thus, Professor Ely concludes that courts should intervene
to protect minorities when the majoritarian political processes mal-

347. See supra note 345.
348. According to the United States Supreme Court, "the scope of the remedy is determined by the nature and extent of the constitutional violation." Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S.
717, 744 (1974) (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16
(1971)); see also Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 409 (stating, "[t]he record convinces us of a failure
of a thorough and efficient education only in the poorer urban districts. We have no right to
extend the remedy any further ....").
349. In all likelihood, the Abbott court probably could not have avoided the separationof-powers limits on its remedial authority that so restricted the Robinson court had it not
narrowed the scope of its inquiry and found the 1975 Act unconstitutional only as it had
been applied to New Jersey's twenty-eight poorer urban school districts. The Abbott court had
to choose a different approach because what good would it have done merely to repeat its
course of actions in Robinson? See Tractenberg, supra note 242 at 1664.
350. JOHN HART ELY, DEMocRAcY AND DISTRUST (1980).
351. IaLat 103.
352. Wright, supra note 209, at 22.
353. ELY, supra note 350, at 86.
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function and systematically discriminate against some minority group.
Malfunction [of the political process] occurs when the process is
undeserving of trust, when (1) the ins are choking off the channels
of political change to ensure that will stay in and the outs will stay
out, or (2) though no one is actually denied a voice or a vote,
representatives beholden to an effective majority are systematically
disadvantaging some minority .... "5
In one section of his book, Professor Ely examines extensively
the concept of virtual representation as the manner in which the United States Constitution frequently protects the interests of those persons who are politically powerless-either because they actually lack
the right to vote within a jurisdiction or because they are consistently
out-voted by a hostile majority-and therefore cannot protect themselves.35 5 According to Ely, "the protective device of guaranteeing
'virtual representation' [proceeds] by tying the interests of those without political power to the interests of those with it" 356 and is based
upon "the quite sensible assumption that an effective majority will not
inordinately threaten its own rights, 357 but instead will act in its
own best interests. Therefore, the concept of virtual representation
suggests that, when the political majority acts in its own best interests, it will also be acting in the best interests of the minority.
The United States Constitution contains at least three provisions
that explicitly or implicitly guarantee virtual representation to a minority group that actually or effectively lacks political power. One is
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV,358 which "'was
designed to ensure a citizen of State A who ventures into State B the
same privileges which the citizens of State B enjoy.' 35 9 The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV does not convey any set of
substantive rights or entitlements; it merely provides a guarantee "that
whatever entitlements those living in a state see fit to vote themselves
will generally be extended to visitors." 360 As Professor Ely explains,
"by constitutionally tying the fate of [literal] outsiders to the fate of
those [in-state residents] possessing political power, the framers en-

354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.

Id
Id
Id
Id

at 103. (emphasis in original).
at 82-88, 100-04.
at 83.
at 100.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
ELY, supra note 350, at 83.
Id
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sured that [the interests of out-of-staters] would be well looked after."3 61 Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has interpreted
the Commerce Clause of Article I, Section 8,362 to mean
that a state [cannot] subject goods produced out of state to taxes it
[does] not impose on goods produced locally. By thus constitutionally binding the interests of out-of-state manufacturers to those of
local manufacturers represented in the legislature, it provide[s] political insurance that the taxes imposed on the former [will] not rise to
a prohibitive or even an unreasonable level. 3
Clearly, one common thread between the Privileges and Immunities
Clause and the Commerce Clause is that both provide virtual representation to actual, geographic outsiders.
However, as this country's reprehensible history of discrimination
against racial minorities so clearly demonstrates, "even [people who
are] technically represented can find themselves functionally powerless
and thus in need of a sort of 'virtual representation' by those more
[politically] powerful than they." 3 4 The Constitutional provision that
guarantees virtual representation to the "functionally powerless" is the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, 365 which "quite
plainly imposes a judicially enforceable duty of virtual representation"
upon the States.366 Even though "the Equal Protection Clause confers no substantive rights and creates no substantive liberties,"367
(just like the Privileges and Immunities Clause), it clearly was designed to ensure that, "insofar as political officials had chosen to
provide or protect [a substantive right or liberty] for some people
(generally people like themselves), they had better make sure that
everyone was being similarly accomodated or be prepared to explain
368
pretty convincingly why not.,
In Abbott v. Burke (Abbott ]l),369 the Supreme Court of New

361. Id
362. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
363. ELY, supra note 350, at 84.
364. Id.
365. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The language of the Fourteenth Amendment clearly
states: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id (emphasis added).
366. ELY, supra note 350, at 86.
367. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 59 (1973) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
368. ELY, supra note 350, at 74.
369. 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990).
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Jersey utilized this same principle of virtual representation to ensure
that students in the state's twenty-eight poorer urban school districts
promptly receive a fully adequate remedy that will begin to vindicate
their fundamental constitutional righe7 ° to a "thorough and efficient"
education. Because of its synthesized interpretation of the "thorough
and efficient" clause37' and because of its extensive analysis of the
enormous substantive and funding disparities between the educational
opportunities available to students in richer suburban districts and
those available to students in poorer urban districts,3" the Supreme
Court of New Jersey ordered the following remedy:
The [1975] Act must be amended, or new legislation passed, so as
to assure that poorer urban districts' educational funding is substantially equal to that of the property-rich districts. "Assure" means that
such funding cannot depend upon the budgeting and taxing decisions
of local school boards. Funding [for the poorer urban districts] must
be certain every year .... The Legislature may devise any remedy . . . so long as it achieves a thorough and efficient education as
defined herein for poorer urban districts.373
The Abbott court has clearly sought to prevent any further systematic
financial disadvantaging of poorer urban school districts by interpreting the "thorough and efficient" clause to require that poorer urban
districts and affluent suburban districts spend "substantially equal"
per-pupil amounts of money on education. Whenever educational
expenditures increase in affluent suburban districts, the state must
ensure that poorer urban districts receive the same increase. According
to one commentator,
the requirement that per-pupil spending in the poorer urban districts
be "approximately equal" to the average per-pupil spending in the
100 affluent suburbs ... places in motion a powerful dynamic.
Every district and taxpayer in the state will now have an interest in
the expenditure decisions of the affluent suburbs. The more the
affluent suburbs spend per pupil, the more resources will become
[Furthermore], it is
available to the poorer urban districts ....
almost certain that the largest share of the newest revenues will be
raised in the large number of middle districts. Every time an affluent suburb increases its per-pupil expenditures, taxes in the middle

370.
371.
372.
373.

See Abbott v. Burke, 495 A.2d 376, 382 (N.J. 1985) (Abbott I).
See supra notes 254-84 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 285-339 and accompanying text.
Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 408-09.
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class districts will increase, yet the schools in those districts will get
nothing in return. 374
The "powerful dynamic" that this commentator describes is virtual
representation. As a result of Abbott's "substantially equal" requirement, new political alliances are likely to emerge, 375 and the new
alliance most likely to, emerge is one between New Jersey's poorer
urban districts and its affluent suburban districts, which will be
aligned against the large bloc of middle class districts. And because
of these shifting political alliances, the supreme court is much less
likely to face a recalcitrant legislature-as it did during the protracted
Robinson v. Cahill litigation.376 The Abbott court has fired a preemptive strike against any possible legislative stalemate with a powerful weapon-"the device of guaranteed virtual representation." 377 By
constitutionally "tying" the interests of residents in poorer urban districts to the interests of residents in affluent suburban districts, who
possess far greater political power, the New Jersey Supreme Court
has attempted to ensure that the interests of people who live in poorer urban districts will be "well looked after" by the Legislature.378
When crafting this remedy, the Abbott court clearly had one eye
on the past (that is, on Robinson v. Cahill) and one eye on the future. While the Abbott court certainly wanted to avoid another constitutional confrontation with a recalcitrant legislature, it also wanted to
ensure that future legislatures could not undercut its remedy by plainly couching that remedy within its comparative-equal-educationalopportunity interpretation of the "thorough and efficient" clause.379
In addition, the Abbott court specifically explained that future legislatures cannot undercut its remedy by placing conditions, such as increases in local property tax rates, upon the poorer urban districts'
receipt of the funding increases to which they are constitutionally
entitled, because of the "substantially equal" requirement; rather, the
state must ensure that the porer urban districts automatically receive
those funding increases. While in Robinson v. Cahill, "those whom
the Court ha[d] sought to protect [were] politically impotent,''310 the
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Id. at 83.
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Abbott court attempted to correct the malfunctioning legislative process38' in order to make certain, by way of "guaranteed virtual rep'
resentation,"382
that poorer urban districts are no longer "politically
impotent." In Robinson IV, "the Court was. . aiding a group that
was unable to achieve effective legislative recourse ' 38 3 for the substantial violation of its fundamental right to a "thorough and efficient"
education-to equal educational opportunity. With the Abbott II remedy, the court sought to ensure that poorer urban districts will, in the
future, be able "to achieve effective legislative recourse" without
further judicial intervention. In the process, the Abbott court did not
violate the separation-of-powers limitations upon its remedial authority
in the public education context, limitations implicit in its acknowledgement that the legislature's role in providing for the education of
New Jersey's schoolchildren is "fundamental and primary. ''384 However, by interpreting the "thorough and efficient" clause to require
that the State automatically provide students in poorer urban districts
with levels of per-pupil education expenditures that are "substantially
equal" to those levels provided by affluent suburban districts to their
relatively advantaged student body, the court has ensured that
"it-and not the Legislature-remains the ultimate expositor of
the ... constitution."385
CONCLUSION

In Abbott v. Burke, the Supreme Court of New Jersey has reaffinned that state's constitutional commitment to provide all children
with equal educational opportunity. As the Abbott court has defined
it, equal educational opportunity does not merely mean an equal
opportunity to receive a "thorough and efficient" education; instead, it
means an equal opportunity to compete in, and contribute to, society.
It means an equal opportunity to succeed. Abbott v. Burke stands for
the proposition that New Jersey's Constitution requires the state to
provide poorer, disadvantaged students with that quantum of education
that will give them the equal opportunity to participate fully in all
aspects of society. As the supreme court put it, "the Constitution .
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requires that poor children be able to compete with the rich.""
This conception of equal educational opportunity is the one most
consistent with the intentions of those people who originally fought
for the creation of public school systems, that public schools open to
all children would "permit the poor to compete" insociety."'
In Robinson v. Cahill, particularly in Robinson I, the supreme
court unequivocally identified the original motivation for New
Jersey's 1875 adoption of the "thorough and efficient" clause: to
guarantee all children equal educational opportunity. But following
Robinson I, the supreme court's attention focused primarily upon the
profound separation-of-powers dispute created by the New Jersey
Legislature's recalcitrant refusal to enact a "thorough and efficient"
public education system. While the Robinson court's decision to defer
initially to the Legislature's fundamental and primary role in education was undoubtedly correct, so was its decision in Robinson IV to
partially abandon that deference and to provide a provisional remedy.
The Legislature's last-minute adoption of the Public School Education
Act of 1975 negated the need for that provisional remedy. But the
profound separation-of-powers conflict did not end there. Instead, that
conflict continued until the Legislature provided full funding for the
1975 Act, which it did only after the court effectively closed the
public school system. All the while, New Jersey's schoolchildren were
not receiving what the state Constitution entitled them to-a
"thorough and efficient" education.
But the Robinson court never had to confront a different separation-of-powers issue, one that many other state supreme courts have
confronted-whether actions challenging the constitutionality of public
school financing schemes presented courts with nonjusticiable political
questions. Until December, 1991, when the trial judge in RIE.F.LT. v.
Cuomo granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the most recent
constitutional challenge to New York's public school financing
scheme, no court had accepted the nonjusticiability argument. And an
examination of the politicil question doctrine reveals that no court
should accept the nonjusticiability argument. Neither the "textually
demonstratable constitutional commitment" formulation of the political
question doctrine nor the "lack of judicially discoverable or manageable standards" formulation provides a persuasive rationale for that

386. Abbott, 575 A.2d at 375.
387. COONS, supra note 1, at 4. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text; see also
supra note 284 and accompanying text.
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argument. While it is true that the education clauses of state constitutions do not provide for judicial review of legislatively enacted
public school financing schemes, it is also true that no constitutional
provision that bestows authority upon the legislative or executive
branch of government provides for judicial review of the exercise of
that authority. If the lack of any mention of judicial review in education clauses turns constitutional challenges to public school financing
schemes into political questions, then virtually every challenge to the
constitutionality of a statute would be a political question. And while
it is also true that the language of most education clauses is general
and vague, the language of other constitutional provisions, like the
Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause, provisions that
courts have always applied in specific cases, are no less general and
vague. Therefore, suggestions that the education clauses in state constitutions do not lend themselves to judicial application are disingenuous at best. If courts do not determine whether legislatively enacted
public school finance schemes comply with constitutional mandates,
who will? State legislatures themselves?
In Abbott, the Supreme Court of New Jersey clearly sought to
avoid the separation-of-powers conflict that it faced throughout the
Robinson v. Cahill litigation. Following its unique holding that the
1975 Act violated the New Jersey Constitution's "thorough and efficient" clause as it had been applied to the state's poorer urban districts, the supreme court provided those districts with a unique remedy-the requirement that poorer urban districts have a per-pupil
amount of funding for public education that is "approximately equal"
to the amount spent in wealthier suburban districts. Because of the
"approximately equal" requirement, the state must automatically provide poorer urban districts with additional education funding every
time wealthier suburban districts increase their educational expenditure
levels. By thus constitutionally tying the interests of poorer urban
districts to the interests of wealthier suburban districts, the supreme
court has employed the device of guaranteed virtual representation to
ensure that the New Jersey Legislature no longer shortchanges the
students in those poorer urban districts, but instead provides them
with equal educational opportunity.
Ironically, public school finance reform litigation has provided
the judiciary, the most undemocratic branch of government, with the
chance to reaffirm the quintessential democratic value-equal opportunity. For the sake of our country's future well-being, which will
depend upon the quality of education our children receive, let us hope
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that courts make the most of this chance.
Joshua Seth Lichtenstein
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